Related papers: Direct Fractional Auction
Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the…
The proliferation of portable devices (PDAs, smartphones, digital multimedia players, and so forth) allows mobile users to carry around a pool of computing, storage and communication resources. Sharing these resources with other users…
Secondary spectrum auction is widely applied in wireless networks for mitigating the spectrum scarcity. In a realistic spectrum trading market, the requests from secondary users often specify the usage of a fixed spectrum frequency band in…
Planning in realistic environments requires searching in large planning spaces. Affordances are a powerful concept to simplify this search, because they model what actions can be successful in a given situation. However, the classical…
Optimizing within the affine maximizer auctions (AMA) is an effective approach for revenue maximizing mechanism design. The AMA mechanisms are strategy-proof and individually rational (if the agents' valuations for the outcomes are…
Budget-feasible procurement auctions play a pivotal role in various AI-driven marketplaces, such as data acquisition and crowdsourcing, where a buyer with a limited budget seeks to procure services from strategic sellers with private costs.…
Recent empirical work demonstrates that online advertisement can exhibit bias in the delivery of ads across users even when all advertisers bid in a non-discriminatory manner. We study the design of ad auctions that, given fair bids, are…
I construct a novel random double auction as a robust bilateral trading mechanism for a profit-maximizing intermediary who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. It works as follows. The intermediary publicly commits to charging a…
We study independent private values auction environments in which the auctioneer's revenue depends nonlinearly on bidders' interim winning probabilities. Our framework accommodates heterogeneity among bidders and places no ad hoc…
The design of revenue-maximizing auctions with strong incentive guarantees is a core concern of economic theory. Computational auctions enable online advertising, sourcing, spectrum allocation, and myriad financial markets. Analytic…
This paper proposes a diffusion-based auto-bidding framework that leverages graph representations to model large-scale auction environments. In such settings, agents must dynamically optimize bidding strategies under constraints defined by…
We design online algorithms for the fair allocation of public goods to a set of $N$ agents over a sequence of $T$ rounds and focus on improving their performance using predictions. In the basic model, a public good arrives in each round,…
We introduce a model of fair division with market values, where indivisible goods must be partitioned among agents with (additive) subjective valuations, and each good additionally has a market value. The market valuation can be viewed as a…
This paper studies multi-unit auctions powered by intermediaries, where each intermediary owns a private set of unit-demand buyers and all intermediaries are networked with each other. Our goal is to incentivize the intermediaries to…
We present a foraging algorithm, GoldenFA, in which search direction is chosen based on the Golden Ratio. We show both theoretically and empirically that GoldenFA is more efficient for a single searcher than a comparable algorithm where…
Peer-to-peer communication has been recently considered as a popular issue for local area services. An innovative resource allocation scheme is proposed to improve the performance of mobile peer-to-peer, i.e., device-to-device (D2D),…
We consider the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible items to a set of $n$ heterogeneous agents, aiming at computing a proportional allocation by introducing subsidy (money). It has been shown by Wu et al. (WINE 2023) that when agents are…
We study sequential procurement auctions where the sellers are provided with a ``best and final offer'' (BAFO) strategy. This strategy allows each seller $i$ to effectively ``freeze'' their price while remaining active in the auction, and…
This paper considers a demand-side aggregation scheme specifically for large numbers of small loads, such as households and small and medium-sized businesses. We introduce a novel auction format, called a staggered clock-proxy auction…
The auction of a single indivisible item is one of the most celebrated problems in mechanism design with transfers. Despite its simplicity, it provides arguably the cleanest and most insightful results in the literature. When the…