Related papers: Direct Fractional Auction
We consider the classical linear assignment problem, and we introduce new auction algorithms for its optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are founded on duality theory, and are related to ideas of competitive bidding by persons…
We propose a multi-agent distributed reinforcement learning algorithm that balances between potentially conflicting short-term reward and sparse, delayed long-term reward, and learns with partial information in a dynamic environment. We…
We develop multiattribute auctions that accommodate generalized additive independent (GAI) preferences. We propose an iterative auction mechanism that maintains prices on potentially overlapping GAI clusters of attributes, thus decreases…
Consider the problem of allocating goods to buyers through an auction. An auction is efficient if the resulting allocation maximizes total welfare, conditional on the information available. If buyers have private values, the…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions to achieve both fairness and efficiency under the constraint that each agent receives exactly the same number of goods (the \emph{balanced…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which…
This paper studies some basic problems in a multiple-object auction model using methodologies from theoretical computer science. We are especially concerned with situations where an adversary bidder knows the bidding algorithms of all the…
Identifying high-revenue mechanisms that are both dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational (IR) is a fundamental challenge in auction design. While theoretical approaches have encountered bottlenecks in…
Behavioural economists have shown that people are often averse to inequality and will make choices to avoid unequal outcomes. In this paper, we consider how to allocate indivisible goods fairly so as to minimize inequality. We consider how…
We develop novel methodology for active feature acquisition (AFA), the study of how to sequentially acquire a dynamic (on a per instance basis) subset of features that minimizes acquisition costs whilst still yielding accurate predictions.…
Online double auctions (DAs) model a dynamic two-sided matching problem with private information and self-interest, and are relevant for dynamic resource and task allocation problems. We present a general method to design truthful DAs, such…
Resource allocation plays a central role in many networked systems such as smart grids, communication networks and urban transportation systems. In these systems, many constraints have physical meaning and having feasible allocation is…
We propose a novel statistical learning method for multi-item auctions that incorporates credible intervals. Our approach employs nonparametric density estimation to estimate credible intervals for bidder types based on historical data. We…
Revenue-optimal auction design is a challenging problem with significant theoretical and practical implications. Sequential auction mechanisms, known for their simplicity and strong strategyproofness guarantees, are often limited by…
In dictionary selection, several atoms are selected from finite candidates that successfully approximate given data points in the sparse representation. We propose a novel efficient greedy algorithm for dictionary selection. Not only does…
Since 2019, most ad exchanges and sell-side platforms (SSPs), in the online advertising industry, shifted from second to first price auctions. Due to the fundamental difference between these auctions, demand-side platforms (DSPs) have had…
Cloud service providers typically provide different types of virtual machines (VMs) to cloud users with various requirements. Thanks to its effectiveness and fairness, auction has been widely applied in this heterogeneous resource…
We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…
In this paper, I summarize our work on online fair division. In particular, I present two models for online fair division: (1) one existing model for fair division in food banks and (2) one new model for fair division of deceased organs to…
We propose a decentralized auction-based algorithm for the solution of dynamic task allocation problems for spatially distributed multi-agent systems. In our approach, each member of the multi-agent team is assigned to at most one task from…