Related papers: A Dynamic Matching Framework for Faster Child Adop…
In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…
We study a dynamic matching problem on a two-sided platform with unbalanced patience, in which long-lived supply accumulates over time with a unit waiting cost per period, while short-lived demand departs if not matched promptly. High- or…
We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…
Many matching markets feature unknown, dynamic arrivals of agents that must match immediately. A caseworker must match an abused child to a foster home, a hospital must assign a patient in critical condition to a room, or a city must place…
In this paper, we study a matching market model on a bipartite network where agents on each side arrive and depart stochastically by a Poisson process. For such a dynamic model, we design a mechanism that decides not only which agents to…
We study a practical two-sided matching problem of allocating children to daycare centers, which has significant social implications. We are cooperating with several municipalities in Japan and our goal is to devise a reliable and…
Motivated by a variety of online matching platforms, we consider demand and supply units which are located i.i.d. in [0,1]^d, and each demand unit needs to be matched with a supply unit. The goal is to minimize the expected average distance…
To guarantee all agents are matched in general, the classic Deferred Acceptance algorithm needs complete preference lists. In practice, preference lists are short, yet stable matching still works well. This raises two questions: $\bullet$…
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two…
Two-sided online matching platforms are employed in various markets. However, agents' preferences in the current market are usually implicit and unknown, thus needing to be learned from data. With the growing availability of dynamic side…
In recent years, significant advances have been made in the design and analysis of fully dynamic maximal matching algorithms. However, these theoretical results have received very little attention from the practical perspective. Few of the…
Recommender systems play an increasingly crucial role in shaping people's opportunities, particularly in online dating platforms. It is essential from the user's perspective to increase the probability of matching with a suitable partner…
We consider design of monetary mechanisms for two-sided matching. Mechanisms in the tradition of the deferred acceptance algorithm, even in variants incorporating money, tend to focus on the criterion of stability. Instead, in this work we…
We propose a model of two-way selection system. It appears in the processes like choosing a mate between men and women, making contracts between job hunters and recruiters, and trading between buyers and sellers. In this paper, we propose a…
We study the performance of general dynamic matching models. This model is defined by a connected graph, where nodes represent the class of items and the edges the compatibilities between items. Items of different classes arrive one by one…
An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…
The Swiss State Secretariat for Migration recently announced a pilot project for a machine learning-based assignment process for refugee resettlement. This approach has the potential to substantially increase the overall employment rate of…
Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such…
Each year, thousands of patients in need of heart transplants face life-threatening wait times due to organ scarcity. While allocation policies aim to maximize population-level outcomes, current approaches often fail to account for the…