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The minimum-effort coordination game, having potentially important implications in both evolutionary biology and sociology, draws recently more attention for the fact that human behavior in this social dilemma is often inconsistent with the…
The goal of the paper is to introduce a set of problems which we call mean field games of timing. We motivate the formulation by a dynamic model of bank run in a continuous-time setting. We briefly review the economic and game theoretic…
We study the asymptotic behavior of solutions to the constrained MFG system as the time horizon $T$ goes to infinity. For this purpose, we analyze first Hamilton-Jacobi equations with state constraints from the viewpoint of weak KAM theory,…
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are…
Mean payoff stochastic games can be studied by means of a nonlinear spectral problem involving the Shapley operator: the ergodic equation. A solution consists in a scalar, called the ergodic constant, and a vector, called bias. The…
We develop the linear programming approach to mean-field games in a general setting. This relaxed control approach allows to prove existence results under weak assumptions, and lends itself well to numerical implementation. We consider…
In this paper, we study a class of first-order mean-field games (MFGs) that model price formation. Using Poincar{\'e} Lemma, we eliminate one of the equations and obtain a variational problem for a single function. This variational problem…
Conventional Mean-field games/control study the behavior of a large number of rational agents moving in the Euclidean spaces. In this work, we explore the mean-field games on Riemannian manifolds. We formulate the mean-field game Nash…
The game dynamical equations are derived from Boltzmann-like equations for individual pair interactions by assuming a certain kind of imitation behavior, the so-called proportional imitation rule. They can be extended to a stochastic…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…
We consider N-player and mean field games in continuous time over a finite horizon, where the position of each agent belongs to {-1,1}. If there is uniqueness of mean field game solutions, e.g. under monotonicity assumptions, then the…
Population games model the evolution of strategic interactions among a large number of uniform agents. Due to the agents' uniformity and quantity, their aggregate strategic choices can be approximated by the solutions of a class of ordinary…
In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…
The designs of many large-scale systems today, from traffic routing environments to smart grids, rely on game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, as the size of an $N$-player game typically grows exponentially with $N$, standard game…
The ergodic equation is a basic tool in the study of mean-payoff stochastic games. Its solvability entails that the mean payoff is independent of the initial state. Moreover, optimal stationary strategies are readily obtained from its…
In a probabilistic mean-field game driven by a linear diffusion an individual player aims to minimize an ergodic long-run cost by controlling the diffusion through a pair of -- increasing and decreasing -- c\`adl\`ag processes, while he is…
Mean field games models describing the limit of a large class of stochastic differential games, as the number of players goes to $+\infty$, have been introduced by J.-M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions. We use a change of variables to transform the…
We consider the basic problem of approximating Nash equilibria in noncooperative games. For monotone games, we design continuous time flows which converge in an averaged sense to Nash equilibria. We also study mean field equilibria, which…
In this article, we introduce a method to approximate solutions of some variational mean field game problems with congestion, by finite sets of player trajectories. These trajectories are obtained by solving a minimization problem similar…
This manuscript discusses planning problems for first- and second-order one-dimensional mean-field games (MFGs). These games are comprised of a Hamilton-Jacobi equation coupled with a Fokker-Planck equation. Applying Poincar\'e's Lemma to…