Related papers: Multiuser Commitment over Noisy Channels
We study a repeated trading problem in which a mechanism designer facilitates trade between a single seller and multiple buyers. Our model generalizes the classic bilateral trade setting to a multi-buyer environment. Specifically, the…
A basic model for key agreement with a remote (or hidden) source is extended to a multi-user model with joint secrecy and privacy constraints over all entities that do not trust each other after key agreement. Multiple entities using…
While the auto-bidding literature predominantly considers independent bidding, we investigate the coordination problem among multiple auto-bidders in online advertising platforms. Two motivating scenarios are: collaborative bidding among…
Algorithms to solve fault-tolerant consensus in asynchronous systems often rely on primitives such as crusader agreement, adopt-commit, and graded broadcast, which provide weaker agreement properties than consensus. Although these…
We study communication over a Multiple Access Channel (MAC) where users can possibly be adversarial. The receiver is unaware of the identity of the adversarial users (if any). When all users are non-adversarial, we want their messages to be…
We study whether large language models acting as autonomous bidders can tacitly collude by coordinating when to accept platform posted payouts in repeated Dutch auctions, without any communication. We present a minimal repeated auction…
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value…
Sequential auctions for identical items with unit-demand, private-value buyers are common and often occur periodically without end, as new bidders replace departing ones. We model bidder uncertainty by introducing a probability that a…
We consider the sample complexity of revenue maximization for multiple bidders in unrestricted multi-dimensional settings. Specifically, we study the standard model of $n$ additive bidders whose values for $m$ heterogeneous items are drawn…
We reconsider the concept of multi-prover commitments, as introduced in the late eighties in the seminal work by Ben-Or et al. As was recently shown by Cr\'{e}peau et al., the security of known two-prover commitment schemes not only relies…
In this paper, we study the information-theoretic limits of oblivious transfer via noisy channels. We also investigate oblivious transfer over a noisy multiple-access channel with two non-colluding senders and a single receiver. The channel…
The standard framework of online bidding algorithm design assumes that the seller commits himself to faithfully implementing the rules of the adopted auction. However, the seller may attempt to cheat in execution to increase his revenue if…
We propose the problem of wiretapped commitment, where two parties, say committer Alice and receiver Bob, engage in a commitment protocol using a noisy channel as a resource, in the presence of an eavesdropper, say Eve. Noisy versions of…
A feasible, secure and collusion-attack-free quantum sealed-bid auction protocol is proposed using a modified scheme for multi-party circular quantum key agreement. In the proposed protocol, the set of all ($n$) bidders is grouped in to $l$…
We present a general framework for designing approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms for multi-item additive auctions, which applies to both truthful and non-truthful auctions. Given a (not necessarily truthful) single-item auction format…
Under rather general assumptions about the properties of a noisy quantum channel, a first quantum protocol is proposed which allows to implement the secret bit commitment with the probability arbitrarily close to unity.
Managing millions of digital auctions is an essential task for modern advertising auction systems. The main approach to managing digital auctions is an autobidding approach, which depends on the Click-Through Rate and Conversion Rate…
We consider auction environments in which at the time of the auction bidders observe signals about their ex-post value. We introduce a model of novice bidders who do not know know the joint distribution of signals and instead build a…
This paper attempt has been made to explain a fuzzy commitment scheme. In the conventional Commitment schemes, both committed string m and valid opening key are required to enable the sender to prove the commitment. However there could be…
In markets such as digital advertising auctions, bidders want to maximize value rather than payoff. This is different to the utility functions typically assumed in auction theory and leads to different strategies and outcomes. We refer to…