Related papers: Preference-CFR$\:$ Beyond Nash Equilibrium for Bet…
Bayesian games model interactive decision-making where players have incomplete information -- e.g., regarding payoffs and private data on players' strategies and preferences -- and must actively reason and update their belief models (with…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the most successful algorithm for finding approximate Nash equilibria in imperfect information games. However, CFR's reliance on full game-tree traversals limits its scalability. For this reason,…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) algorithms are widely used to compute a Nash equilibrium (NE) in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information extensive-form games (IIGs). Among them, Predictive CFR$^+$ (PCFR$^+$) is particularly…
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is an effective algorithm for solving extensive games with imperfect information (IIEGs). However, CFR is only allowed to be applied in known environments, where the transition function of the chance…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization and variants (e.g. Public Chance Sampling CFR and Pure CFR) have been known as the best approaches for creating approximate Nash equilibrium solutions for imperfect information games such as poker. This…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR)} is the popular method for finding approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games with imperfect information. CFR solves games by travsersing the full game tree iteratively, which limits…
In general, two-agent decision-making problems can be modeled as a two-player game, and a typical solution is to find a Nash equilibrium in such game. Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a well-known method to find a Nash…
Regret minimization has proved to be a versatile tool for tree-form sequential decision making and extensive-form games. In large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games, modern extensions of counterfactual regret minimization (CFR)…
In two-player zero-sum games, if both players minimize their average external regret, then the average of the strategy profiles converges to a Nash equilibrium. For n-player general-sum games, however, theoretical guarantees for regret…
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a family of iterative algorithms that are the most popular and, in practice, fastest approach to approximately solving large imperfect-information games. In this paper we introduce novel CFR…
No-regret learning has emerged as a powerful tool for solving extensive-form games. This was facilitated by the counterfactual-regret minimization (CFR) framework, which relies on the instantiation of regret minimizers for simplexes at each…
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a family of algorithms for effectively solving imperfect-information games. To enhance CFR's applicability in large games, researchers use neural networks to approximate its behavior. However,…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) and its variants are widely recognized as effective algorithms for solving extensive-form imperfect information games. Recently, many improvements have been focused on enhancing the convergence speed…
In the domain of machine learning and game theory, the quest for Nash Equilibrium (NE) in extensive-form games with incomplete information is challenging yet crucial for enhancing AI's decision-making support under varied scenarios.…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the leading framework for solving large imperfect-information games. It converges to an equilibrium by iteratively traversing the game tree. In order to deal with extremely large games,…
The Nash Equilibrium (NE) assumes rational play in imperfect-information Extensive-Form Games (EFGs) but fails to ensure optimal strategies for off-equilibrium branches of the game tree, potentially leading to suboptimal outcomes in…
Imperfect Information Games (IIGs) offer robust models for scenarios where decision-makers face uncertainty or lack complete information. Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) has been one of the most successful family of algorithms for…
To establish last-iterate convergence for Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) algorithms in learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) of extensive-form games (EFGs), recent studies reformulate learning an NE of the original EFG as learning the…
A growing line of work reframes preference-based fine-tuning of large language models game-theoretically: Nash Learning from Human Feedback (NLHF) recasts the problem as a zero-sum game over policies. However, optimization is over expected…