Related papers: Sample-Efficient Regret-Minimizing Double Oracle i…
No-regret learning has emerged as a powerful tool for solving extensive-form games. This was facilitated by the counterfactual-regret minimization (CFR) framework, which relies on the instantiation of regret minimizers for simplexes at each…
Extensive-form games (EFGs) are a common model of multi-agent interactions with imperfect information. State-of-the-art algorithms for solving these games typically perform full walks of the game tree that can prove prohibitively slow in…
Extensive-form games provide a versatile framework for modeling interactions of multiple agents subjected to imperfect observations and stochastic events. In recent years, two paradigms, policy space response oracles (PSRO) and…
The problem of two-player zero-sum Markov games has recently attracted increasing interests in theoretical studies of multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL). In particular, for finite-horizon episodic Markov decision processes (MDPs), it…
We study the performance of optimistic regret-minimization algorithms for both minimizing regret in, and computing Nash equilibria of, zero-sum extensive-form games. In order to apply these algorithms to extensive-form games, a…
Hindsight rationality is an approach to playing general-sum games that prescribes no-regret learning dynamics for individual agents with respect to a set of deviations, and further describes jointly rational behavior among multiple agents…
Online gradient descent (OGD) is well known to be doubly optimal under strong convexity or monotonicity assumptions: (1) in the single-agent setting, it achieves an optimal regret of $\Theta(\log T)$ for strongly convex cost functions; and…
Regret matching (RM) -- and its modern variants -- is a foundational online algorithm that has been at the heart of many AI breakthrough results in solving benchmark zero-sum games, such as poker. Yet, surprisingly little is known so far in…
Multi-agent robust reinforcement learning, also known as multi-player robust Markov games (RMGs), is a crucial framework for modeling competitive interactions under environmental uncertainties, with wide applications in multi-agent systems.…
Reinforcement learning (RL) in large environments often suffers from severe computational bottlenecks, as conventional regret minimization algorithms require repeated, costly calls to planning and statistical estimation oracles. While…
A recent emerging trend in the literature on learning in games has been concerned with providing faster learning dynamics for correlated and coarse correlated equilibria in normal-form games. Much less is known about the significantly more…
The extensive-form game has been studied considerably in recent years. It can represent games with multiple decision points and incomplete information, and hence it is helpful in formulating games with uncertain inputs, such as poker. We…
In this paper, we introduce the first algorithmic framework for Blackwell approachability on the sequence-form polytope, the class of convex polytopes capturing the strategies of players in extensive-form games (EFGs). This leads to a new…
Motivated by alternating learning dynamics in two-player games, a recent work by Cevher et al.(2024) shows that $o(\sqrt{T})$ alternating regret is possible for any $T$-round adversarial Online Linear Optimization (OLO) problem, and left as…
Policy space response oracles (PSRO) is a multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm that has achieved state-of-the-art performance in very large two-player zero-sum games. PSRO is based on the tabular double oracle (DO) method, an…
We introduce DREAM, a deep reinforcement learning algorithm that finds optimal strategies in imperfect-information games with multiple agents. Formally, DREAM converges to a Nash Equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games and to an…
In this paper, we establish efficient and uncoupled learning dynamics so that, when employed by all players in multiplayer perfect-recall imperfect-information extensive-form games, the trigger regret of each player grows as $O(\log T)$…
Learning and equilibrium computation in games are fundamental problems across computer science and economics, with applications ranging from politics to machine learning. Much of the work in this area revolves around a simple algorithm…
We study deception in adversarial graph traversal, where a mobile agent seeks to reach a goal with minimum cost while an adversary alters edge costs to increase the total traversal cost. Unlike prior works that assume fixed…
The double oracle algorithm is a popular method of solving games, because it is able to reduce computing equilibria to computing a series of best responses. However, its theoretical properties are not well understood. In this paper, we…