Related papers: Commitment and Randomization in Communication

I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score. Based on the score, the receiver makes a decision. The…

We consider the fundamental problem of communicating an estimate of a real number $x\in[0,1]$ using a single bit. A sender that knows $x$ chooses a value $X\in\set{0,1}$ to transmit. In turn, a receiver estimates $x$ based on the value of…

We consider the behaviour of $\lambda$-discounted zero-sum games as the discount factor $\lambda$ approaches 0 (that is, the players are more and more patient), in the context of games with stage duration. In stochastic games with stage…

We investigate the problem of designing optimal classifiers in the strategic classification setting, where the classification is part of a game in which players can modify their features to attain a favorable classification outcome (while…

The partial monitoring (PM) framework provides a theoretical formulation of sequential learning problems with incomplete feedback. On each round, a learning agent plays an action while the environment simultaneously chooses an outcome. The…

A common assumption in causal inference is that random treatment assignment ensures that potential outcomes are independent of treatment, or in one word, unconfoundedness. This paper highlights that randomization and unconfoundedness are…

Many learning algorithms are known to converge to an equilibrium for specific classes of games if the same learning algorithm is adopted by all agents. However, when the agents are self-interested, a natural question is whether agents have…

We consider concurrent mean-payoff games, a very well-studied class of two-player (player 1 vs player 2) zero-sum games on finite-state graphs where every transition is assigned a reward between 0 and 1, and the payoff function is the…

Political and advertising campaigns increasingly exploit social networks to spread information and persuade people. This paper studies a persuasion model to examine whether such a strategy is better than simply sending public signals.…

We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…

Unconditionally secure non-relativistic bit commitment is known to be impossible in both the classical and the quantum world. However, when committing to a string of n bits at once, how far can we stretch the quantum limits? In this letter,…

Unconditionally secure non-relativistic bit commitment is known to be impossible in both the classical and the quantum worlds. But when committing to a string of n bits at once, how far can we stretch the quantum limits? In this paper, we…

In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender, who observes a state, commits to a randomized signaling scheme that guides a self-interested receiver's actions. Classical models assume the receiver knows the commitment. We, instead, study the…

In quantum information theory, it is widely believed that entanglement concentration for bipartite pure states is asymptotically reversible. In order to examine this, we give a precise formulation of the problem, and show a trade-off…

In coin tossing two remote participants want to share a uniformly distributed random bit. At the least in the quantum version, each participant test whether or not the other has attempted to create a bias on this bit. It is requested that,…

We study a Bayesian persuasion setting in which the receiver is trying to match the (binary) state of the world. The sender's utility is partially aligned with the receiver's, in that conditioned on the receiver's action, the sender derives…

We consider an infinite collection of agents who make decisions, sequentially, about an unknown underlying binary state of the world. Each agent, prior to making a decision, receives an independent private signal whose distribution depends…

We describe new unconditionally secure bit commitment schemes whose security is based on Minkowski causality and the monogamy of quantum entanglement. We first describe an ideal scheme that is purely deterministic, in the sense that neither…

Sender-receiver games are simple models of information transmission that provide a formalism to study the evolution of honest signaling and deception between a sender and a receiver. In many practical scenarios, lies often affect groups of…

Hadfield-Menell et al. (2017) propose the Off-Switch Game, a model of Human-AI cooperation in which AI agents always defer to humans because they are uncertain about our preferences. I explain two reasons why AI agents might not defer.…