Related papers: Constrained Truthful Obnoxious Two-Facility Locati…
We study mechanism design for public-good provision under a noisy privacy-preserving transformation of individual agents' reported preferences. The setting is a standard binary model with transfers and quasi-linear utility. Agents report…
We study the problem of fairly and truthfully allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive preferences. Specifically, we consider truthful mechanisms outputting allocations that satisfy EF$^{+u}_{-v}$, where, in an…
We consider competitive facility location as a two-stage multi-agent system with two types of clients. For a given host graph with weighted clients on the vertices, first facility agents strategically select vertices for opening their…
We consider the problem of locating a single facility on the real line. This facility serves a set of agents, each of whom is located on the line, and incurs a cost equal to his distance from the facility. An agent's location is private…
We study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponents' rewards. We characterize all individually rational (IR)…
We initiate the study of mechanism design with outliers, where the designer can discard $z$ agents from the social cost objective. This setting is particularly relevant when some agents exhibit extreme or atypical preferences. As a natural…
We introduce and study strongly truthful mechanisms and their applications. We use strongly truthful mechanisms as a tool for implementation in undominated strategies for several problems,including the design of externality resistant…
It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechanism is truthful? We wish to design truthful mechanisms,…
We consider k-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations on the real line, and a mechanism maps them to k facilities. Each agent seeks to minimize his connection cost, given by a nonnegative increasing function…
We study the fair division problem on divisible heterogeneous resources (the cake cutting problem) with strategic agents, where each agent can manipulate his/her private valuation in order to receive a better allocation. A…
Decision-theoretic planning with risk-sensitive planning objectives is important for building autonomous agents or decision-support systems for real-world applications. However, this line of research has been largely ignored in the…
We consider a selfish variant of the knapsack problem. In our version, the items are owned by agents, and each agent can misrepresent the set of items she owns---either by avoiding reporting some of them (understating), or by reporting…
We present a mechanism for reservations of bursty resources that is both truthful and robust. It consists of option contracts whose pricing structure induces users to reveal the true likelihoods that they will purchase a given resource.…
We study a variant of the competitive facility location problem, in which a company is to locate new facilities in a market where competitor's facilities already exist. We consider the scenario where only a limited number of possible…
A principal must allocate a set of heterogeneous tasks (or objects) among multiple agents. The principal has preferences over the allocation. Each agent has preferences over which tasks they are assigned, which are their private…
We study the envy-free house allocation problem when agents have uncertain preferences over items and consider several well-studied preference uncertainty models. The central problem that we focus on is computing an allocation that has the…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized…
We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…