Related papers: Envy-Free and Efficient Allocations for Graphical …
We study the fair division of indivisible chores among agents with additive disutility functions. We investigate the existence of allocations satisfying the popular fairness notion of envy-freeness up to any chore (EFX), and its…
The problem of finding envy-free allocations of indivisible goods can not always be solved; therefore, it is common to study some relaxations such as envy-free up to one good (EF1). Another property of interest for efficiency of an…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible items for groups of agents from the perspectives of the agents and a centralized allocator. In our setting, the centralized allocator is interested in ensuring the allocation is fair among the…
We consider two models of fair division with indivisible items: one for goods and one for bads. For goods, we study two generalized envy freeness proxies (EF1 and EFX for goods) and three common welfare (utilitarian, egalitarian and Nash)…
Fair allocation of indivisible goods is a fundamental problem at the interface of economics and computer science. Traditional approaches focus either on randomized allocations that are fair in expectation or deterministic allocations that…
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items in a model with goods, chores, and copies, as a unified framework for studying: (1)~the existence of EFX and other solution concepts for goods with copies; (2)~the existence of EFX and other…
We study the problem of finding fair allocations -- EF1 and EFX -- of indivisible goods with orientations. In an orientation, every agent gets items from their own predetermined set. For EF1, we show that EF1 orientations always exist when…
We consider allocating indivisible goods with provable fairness guarantees that are satisfied regardless of which bundle of items each agent receives. Symmetrical allocations of this type are known to exist for divisible resources, such as…
The two standard fairness notions in the resource allocation literature are proportionality and envy-freeness. If there are n agents competing for the available resources, then proportionality requires that each agent receives at least a…
We study the envy free pricing problem faced by a seller who wishes to maximize revenue by setting prices for bundles of items. If there is an unlimited supply of items and agents are single minded then we show that finding the revenue…
We study fair division of indivisible chores among $n$ agents with additive disutility functions. Two well-studied fairness notions for indivisible items are envy-freeness up to one/any item (EF1/EFX) and the standard notion of economic…
We study the problem of Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division, where exactly p vertices of an undirected graph must be allocated to agents such that each agent receives a connected share and does not envy another agent's share.…
We study several fairness notions in allocating indivisible chores (i.e., items with non-positive values) to agents who have additive and submodular cost functions. The fairness criteria we are concern with are envy-free up to any item…
We study fair resource allocation under a connectedness constraint wherein a set of indivisible items are arranged on a path and only connected subsets of items may be allocated to the agents. An allocation is deemed fair if it satisfies…
Equitable allocation of indivisible items involves partitioning the items among agents such that everyone derives (almost) equal utility. We consider the approximate notion of \textit{equitability up to one item} (EQ1) and focus on the…
We study a discrete fair division problem where $n$ agents have additive valuation functions over a set of $m$ goods. We focus on the well-known $\alpha$-EFX fairness criterion, according to which the envy of an agent for another agent is…
Equitability (EQ) in fair division requires that items be allocated such that all agents value the bundle they receive equally. With indivisible items, an equitable allocation may not exist, and hence we instead consider a meaningful…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating the vertices of a graph among $n$ agents, where the value of a bundle is determined by its cut value -- the number of edges with exactly one endpoint in the bundle. This model naturally captures…
We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. We focus on envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) -- an important fairness notion in fair division of indivisible goods. A…
We study the fair division of indivisible goods with conflicts between pairs of goods, represented by a graph $G = (V, E)$. We consider ``soft'' conflicts: assigning two adjacent goods to the same agent is allowed, but we seek allocations…