English

Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Chores with Surplus

Computer Science and Game Theory 2023-05-23 v3

Abstract

We study fair division of indivisible chores among nn agents with additive disutility functions. Two well-studied fairness notions for indivisible items are envy-freeness up to one/any item (EF1/EFX) and the standard notion of economic efficiency is Pareto optimality (PO). There is a noticeable gap between the results known for both EF1 and EFX in the goods and chores settings. The case of chores turns out to be much more challenging. We reduce this gap by providing slightly relaxed versions of the known results on goods for the chores setting. Interestingly, our algorithms run in polynomial time, unlike their analogous versions in the goods setting. We introduce the concept of kk surplus which means that up to kk more chores are allocated to the agents and each of them is a copy of an original chore. We present a polynomial-time algorithm which gives EF1 and PO allocations with (n1)(n-1) surplus. We relax the notion of EFX slightly and define tEFX which requires that the envy from agent ii to agent jj is removed upon the transfer of any chore from the ii's bundle to jj's bundle. We give a polynomial-time algorithm that in the chores case for 33 agents returns an allocation which is either proportional or tEFX. Note that proportionality is a very strong criterion in the case of indivisible items, and hence both notions we guarantee are desirable.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2305.04788,
  title  = {Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Chores with Surplus},
  author = {Hannaneh Akrami and Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury and Jugal Garg and Kurt Mehlhorn and Ruta Mehta},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.04788},
  year   = {2023}
}