Related papers: Oscillatory equilibrium in asymmetric evolutionary…
We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…
Building upon the eco-evolutionary game dynamics framework established by Tilman et al., we investigate stochastic fluctuations in a two-strategy system incorporating environmental feedback mechanisms, where the payoff matrix exhibits…
The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), introduced by Smith and Price, is a refinement of Nash equilibrium in 2-player symmetric games in order to explain counter-intuitive natural phenomena, whose existence is not…
Evolutionary game theory is an abstract and simple, but very powerful way to model evolutionary dynamics. Even complex biological phenomena can sometimes be abstracted to simple two-player games. But often, the interaction between several…
Evolutionary game dynamics of two players with two strategies has been studied in great detail. These games have been used to model many biologically relevant scenarios, ranging from social dilemmas in mammals to microbial diversity. Some…
The replicator equation is a simple model of evolution that leads to stable form of Nash Equilibrium, Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). It has been studied in connection with Evolutionary Game Theory and was originally developed for…
Existing theoretical models of evolution focus on the relative fitness advantages of different mutants in a population while the dynamic behavior of the population size is mostly left unconsidered. We here present a generic stochastic model…
A discrete-time version of the replicator equation for two-strategy games is studied. The stationary properties differ from that of continuous time for sufficiently large values of the parameters, where periodic and chaotic behavior replace…
We discuss a population of sequences subject to mutations and frequency-dependent selection, where the fitness of a sequence depends on the composition of the entire population. This type of dynamics is crucial to understand the evolution…
In the realm of evolutionary game theory, standard frameworks typically presuppose that every player possesses comprehensive knowledge and unrestricted access to the entire strategy space. However, real-world human society inherently…
A replicator equation with explicit space and global regulation is considered. This model provides a natural framework to follow frequencies of species that are distributed in the space. For this model, analogues to classical notions of the…
We study the exponential stability of evolutionary equations. The focus is laid on second order problems and we provide a way to rewrite them as a suitable first order evolutionary equation, for which the stability can be proved by using…
Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges faced by…
People tend to align their use of language to the linguistic behaviour of their own ingroup and to simultaneously diverge from the language use of outgroups. This paper proposes to model this phenomenon of sociolinguistic identity…
The literature on centralized matching markets often assumes that a true preference of each player is known to herself and fixed, but empirical evidence casts doubt on its plausibility. To circumvent the problem, we consider evolutionary…
Evolutionary game dynamics describes not only frequency dependent genetical evolution, but also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been shown that the details of strategy update…
Evolutionary games provide the theoretical backbone for many aspects of our social life: from cooperation to crime, from climate inaction to imperfect vaccination and epidemic spreading, from antibiotics overuse to biodiversity…
We consider evolutionary dynamics for population games in which players have a continuum of strategies at their disposal. Models in this setting amount to infinite-dimensional differential equations evolving on the manifold of probability…
Oscillatory behavior is ubiquitous in many natural and engineered systems, often emerging through self-regulating mechanisms. In this paper, we address the challenge of stabilizing a desired oscillatory pattern in a networked system where…
Imitation dynamics for population games are studied and their asymptotic properties analyzed. In the considered class of imitation dynamics - that encompass the replicator equation as well as other models previously considered in…