Evolutionary games and quasispecies
Disordered Systems and Neural Networks
2009-11-07 v2 Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems
Populations and Evolution
Abstract
We discuss a population of sequences subject to mutations and frequency-dependent selection, where the fitness of a sequence depends on the composition of the entire population. This type of dynamics is crucial to understand the evolution of genomic regulation. Mathematically, it takes the form of a reaction-diffusion problem that is nonlinear in the population state. In our model system, the fitness is determined by a simple mathematical game, the hawk-dove game. The stationary population distribution is found to be a quasispecies with properties different from those which hold in fixed fitness landscapes.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.cond-mat/0209086,
title = {Evolutionary games and quasispecies},
author = {M. Laessig and L. Peliti and F. Tria},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:cond-mat/0209086},
year = {2009}
}
Comments
7 pages, 2 figures. Typos corrected, references updated. An exact solution for the hawks-dove game is provided