Related papers: A Generalization of von Neumann's Reduction from t…

This short note demonstrates how one can define a transformation of a non-zero sum game into a zero sum, so that the optimal mixed strategy achieving equilibrium always exists. The transformation is equivalent to introduction of a passive…

In this paper, we formulate a two-player zero-sum game under dynamic constraints defined by hybrid dynamical equations. The game consists of a min-max problem involving a cost functional that depends on the actions and resulting solutions…

We consider a formulation of a non zero-sum n players game by an n+1 players zero-sum game. We suppose the existence of the n+1-th player in addition to n players in the main game, and virtual subsidies to the n players which is provided by…

The peculiarity of adversarial team games resides in the asymmetric information available to the team members during the play, which makes the equilibrium computation problem hard even with zero-sum payoffs. The algorithms available in the…

Gale, Kuhn and Tucker (1950) introduced two ways to reduce a zero-sum game by packaging some strategies with respect to a probability distribution on them. In terms of value, they gave conditions for a desirable reduction. We show that a…

Learning from repeated play in a fixed two-player zero-sum game is a classic problem in game theory and online learning. We consider a variant of this problem where the game payoff matrix changes over time, possibly in an adversarial…

We study the value of a two-player zero-sum game on a random matrix $M\in \mathbb{R}^{n\times m}$, defined by $v(M) = \min_{x\in\Delta_n}\max_{y\in \Delta_m}x^T M y$. In the setting where $n=m$ and $M$ has i.i.d. standard Gaussian entries,…

We revisit classic algorithmic search and optimization problems from the perspective of competition. Rather than a single optimizer minimizing expected cost, we consider a zero-sum game in which an optimization problem is presented to two…

We explore a version of the minimax theorem for two-person win-lose games with infinitely many pure strategies. In the countable case, we give a combinatorial condition on the game which implies the minimax property. In the general case, we…

We propose a unifying additive theory for standard conventions in Combinatorial Game Theory, including normal-, mis\`ere- and scoring-play, studied by Berlekamp, Conway, Dorbec, Ettinger, Guy, Larsson, Milley, Neto, Nowakowski, Renault,…

We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has more information on the game than his opponent. We show how to construct numerical schemes for the value function of this game, which is given…

\emph{Ex ante} correlation is becoming the mainstream approach for \emph{sequential adversarial team games}, where a team of players faces another team in a zero-sum game. It is known that team members' asymmetric information makes both…

We consider game theory from the perspective of quantum algorithms. Strategies in classical game theory are either pure (deterministic) or mixed (probabilistic). We introduce these basic ideas in the context of a simple example, closely…

For two-person dynamic zero-sum games (both discrete and continuous settings), we investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity and the limit of value…

The performance of two pivoting algorithms, due to Lemke and Cottle and Dantzig, is studied on linear complementarity problems (LCPs) that arise from infinite games, such as parity, average-reward, and discounted games. The algorithms have…

Two-team zero-sum games are one of the most important paradigms in game theory. In this paper, we focus on finding an unexploitable equilibrium in large team games. An unexploitable equilibrium is a worst-case policy, where members in the…

We introduce two min-max problems: the first problem is to minimize the supremum of finitely many rational functions over a compact basic semi-algebraic set whereas the second problem is a 2-player zero-sum polynomial game in randomized…

We define a class of zero-sum games with combinatorial structure, where the best response problem of one player is to maximize a submodular function. For example, this class includes security games played on networks, as well as the problem…

Zero-sum games have long guided artificial intelligence research, since they possess both a rich strategy space of best-responses and a clear evaluation metric. What's more, competition is a vital mechanism in many real-world multi-agent…

We give new characterizations of core imputations for the following games: * The assignment game. * Concurrent games, i.e., general graph matching games having non-empty core. * The unconstrained bipartite $b$-matching game (edges can be…