Related papers: Mechanism Design for Exchange Markets
In bandwidth allocation, competing agents wish to transmit data along paths of links in a network, and each agent's utility is equal to the minimum bandwidth she receives among all links in her desired path. Recent market mechanisms for…
This paper explores the Mechanism Design aspects of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem where the total facility capacity is less than the number of agents. Following the framework outlined by Aziz et al., the Social Welfare of…
While historically, economists have been primarily occupied with analyzing the behaviour of the markets, electronic trading gave rise to a new class of unprecedented problems associated with market fairness, transparency and manipulation.…
In budget-feasible mechanism design, a buyer wishes to procure a set of items of maximum value from self-interested players. We have a valuation function $v:2^U \to \mathbb{R}_+$, where $U$ is the set of all items, where $v(S)$ specifies…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
In this paper we consider a mechanism design problem in the context of large-scale crowdsourcing markets such as Amazon's Mechanical Turk, ClickWorker, CrowdFlower. In these markets, there is a requester who wants to hire workers to…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
This paper considers prior-independent mechanism design, namely identifying a single mechanism that has near optimal performance on every prior distribution. We show that mechanisms with truthtelling equilibria, a.k.a., revelation…
Designing a financial market that works well is very important for developing and maintaining an advanced economy, but is not easy because changing detailed rules, even ones that seem trivial, sometimes causes unexpected large impacts and…
We consider the design of mechanisms that allocate limited resources among self-interested agents using neural networks. Unlike the recent works that leverage machine learning for revenue maximization in auctions, we consider welfare…
This study explores the design of an efficient rebate policy in auction markets, focusing on a continuous-time setting with competition among market participants. In this model, a stock exchange collects transaction fees from auction…
Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to marry computation and incentives, mainly by leveraging monetary transfers between designer and selfish agents involved. This is principally because in absence of money, very little can be done to…
In light of the growing interest in agent-based market models, we bring together several earlier works in which we considered the topic of self-consistent market modelling. Building upon the binary game structure of Challet and Zhang, we…
Following the recent literature on make take fees policies, we consider an exchange wishing to set a suitable contract with several market makers in order to improve trading quality on its platform. To do so, we use a principal-agent…
To regulate a social system comprised of self-interested agents, economic incentives are often required to induce a desirable outcome. This incentive design problem naturally possesses a bilevel structure, in which a designer modifies the…
Researchers have long proposed using economic approaches to resource allocation in computer systems. However, few of these proposals became operational, let alone commercial. Questions persist about the economic approach regarding its…
We consider the impact of fairness requirements on the social efficiency of truthful mechanisms for trade, focusing on Bayesian bilateral-trade settings. Unlike the full information case in which all gains-from-trade can be realized and…
We study fair allocation of constrained resources, where a market designer optimizes overall welfare while maintaining group fairness. In many large-scale settings, utilities are not known in advance, but are instead observed after…
Resource distribution is a fundamental problem in economic and policy design, particularly when demand and supply are not naturally aligned. Without regulation, wealthier individuals may monopolize this resource, leaving the needs of others…
We consider an infinite horizon dynamic mechanism design problem with interdependent valuations. In this setting the type of each agent is assumed to be evolving according to a first order Markov process and is independent of the types of…