Related papers: Mechanism Design for Exchange Markets

We develop a versatile methodology for multidimensional mechanism design that incorporates side information about agents to generate high welfare and high revenue simultaneously. Side information sources include advice from domain experts,…

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and…

We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent bidders with arbitrary demand constraints when either the number of bidders is a constant or the number of items is a constant. In the first…

This paper uses the development of multi-agent market models to present a unified approach to the joint questions of how financial market movements may be simulated, predicted, and hedged against. We examine the effect of different market…

This paper concerns the mechanism design for online resource allocation in a strategic setting. In this setting, a single supplier allocates capacity-limited resources to requests that arrive in a sequential and arbitrary manner. Each…

Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by…

This work studies equilibrium problems under uncertainty where firms maximize their profits in a robust way when selling their output. Robust optimization plays an increasingly important role when best guaranteed objective values are to be…

Most finance studies are discussed on the basis of several hypotheses, for example, investors rationally optimize their investment strategies. However, the hypotheses themselves are sometimes criticized. Market impacts, where trades of…

Online double auctions (DAs) model a dynamic two-sided matching problem with private information and self-interest, and are relevant for dynamic resource and task allocation problems. We present a general method to design truthful DAs, such…

This paper studies mechanism design environments in which the designer does not know the distribution of agents' private information a priori and instead learns from agents' behavior induced by the mechanism itself. We formalize a notion of…

Consider an exchange mechanism which accepts diversified offers of various commodities and redistributes everything it receives. We impose certain conditions of fairness and convenience on such a mechanism and show that it admits unique…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among agents which are equipped with {\em leveled} valuation functions. Such preferences, that have been studied before in economics and fair division literature, capture a simple…

We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…

Ensuring sufficient liquidity is one of the key challenges for designers of prediction markets. Various market making algorithms have been proposed in the literature and deployed in practice, but there has been little effort to evaluate…

In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…

The key characteristic of a true free market economy is that exchanges are entirely voluntary. When there is a monopoly in the creation of currency as we have in today's markets, you no longer have a true free market. Features of the…

We consider an exchange who wishes to set suitable make-take fees to attract liquidity on its platform. Using a principal-agent approach, we are able to describe in quasi-explicit form the optimal contract to propose to a market maker. This…

We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations in such settings can…

This paper proposes a new one-sided matching market model in which every agent has a cost function that is allowed to take a negative value. Our model aims to capture the situation where some agents can profit by exchanging their obtained…

This paper presents a new financial market simulator that may be used as a tool in both industry and academia for research in market microstructure. It allows multiple automated traders and/or researchers to simultaneously connect to an…