English

Graphical Exchange Mechanisms

Computer Science and Game Theory 2024-09-24 v1 Theoretical Economics Combinatorics

Abstract

Consider an exchange mechanism which accepts diversified offers of various commodities and redistributes everything it receives. We impose certain conditions of fairness and convenience on such a mechanism and show that it admits unique prices, which equalize the value of offers and returns for each individual. We next define the complexity of a mechanism in terms of certain integers τij,πij\tau_{ij},\pi_{ij} and kik_{i} that represent the time required to exchange ii for jj, the difficulty in determining the exchange ratio, and the dimension of the message space. We show that there are a finite number of minimally complex mechanisms, in each of which all trade is conducted through markets for commodity pairs. Finally we consider minimal mechanisms with smallest worst-case complexities τ=maxτij\tau=\max\tau_{ij} and π=maxπij\pi=\max\pi_{ij}. For m>3m>3 commodities, there are precisely three such mechanisms, one of which has a distinguished commodity -- the money -- that serves as the sole medium of exchange. As mm\rightarrow \infty the money mechanism is the only one with bounded (π,τ)\left( \pi ,\tau\right) .

Cite

@article{arxiv.1512.04637,
  title  = {Graphical Exchange Mechanisms},
  author = {Pradeep Dubey and Siddhartha Sahi and Martin Shubik},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.04637},
  year   = {2024}
}

Comments

26 pages

R2 v1 2026-06-22T12:09:53.270Z