Related papers: Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofne…
A menu description exposes strategyproofness by presenting a mechanism to player $i$ in two steps. Step (1) uses others' reports to describe $i$'s menu of potential outcomes. Step (2) uses $i$'s report to select $i$'s favorite outcome from…
Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching…
We study the strategic simplicity of stable matching mechanisms where one side has fixed preferences, termed priorities. Specifically, we ask which priorities are such that the strategyproofness of deferred acceptance (DA) can be recognized…
An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…
The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) is the most widely accepted and used algorithm to match students, workers, or residents to colleges, firms or hospitals respectively. In this paper, we consider for the first time, the complexity of…
The deferred acceptance algorithm is an elegant solution to the stable matching problem that guarantees optimality and truthfulness for one side of the market. Despite these desirable guarantees, it is susceptible to strategic misreporting…
We conduct the first laboratory school choice experiment in which parents-the relevant decision makers in the field-are the experimental subjects. We compare Deferred Acceptance (DA) with two manipulable but potentially more efficient…
We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful…
Real-life applications of deferred-acceptance (DA) matching algorithms sometimes exhibit errors or changes to the matching inputs that are discovered only after the algorithm has been run and the results are announced to participants.…
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a…
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is an elegant procedure for finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. It ensures that no pair of agents prefers each other to their matched partners. In this work, we initiate the study…
In many machine learning applications, there are multiple decision-makers involved, both automated and human. The interaction between these agents often goes unaddressed in algorithmic development. In this work, we explore a simple version…
Who gains and who loses from a manipulable school-choice mechanism? Studying the outcomes of sincere and sophisticated students under the manipulable Boston Mechanism as compared with the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance, we provide…
A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects…
We initiate the study of deep learning for the automated design of two-sided matching mechanisms. What is of most interest is to use machine learning to understand the possibility of new tradeoffs between strategy-proofness and stability.…
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is stable and strategy-proof, but can produce outcomes that are Pareto-inefficient for students, and thus several alternative mechanisms have been proposed to correct this inefficiency. However, we…
Recent literature highlights the advantages of implementing social rules via dynamic game forms. We characterize when truth-telling remains a dominant strategy in gradual mechanisms implementing strategy-proof social rules, where agents…
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism can generate inefficient placements. Although Pareto-dominant mechanisms exist, it remains unclear which and how many students could improve. We characterize the set of unimprovable students and show…
Addressing the large inefficiencies generated by the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism requires priority violations, but which ones are justifiable? The leading approach is to ask individuals if they consent to waive their priority…