Related papers: Extending Stable and Popular Matching Algorithms f…
In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…
We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization…
In this paper, we consider the Hospital Residents problem (HR) and the Hospital Residents problem with Lower Quotas (HRLQ). In this model with two sided preferences, stability is a well accepted notion of optimality. However, in the…
For a set A of n applicants and a set I of m items, we consider a problem of computing a matching of applicants to items, i.e., a function M mapping A to I; here we assume that each applicant $x \in A$ provides a preference list on items in…
This paper gives an overview on and summarizes existing complexity and algorithmic results of some variants of the Stable Marriage and the Stable Roommates problems. The last section defines a list of stable matching problems mentioned in…
We study the graphs formed from instances of the stable matching problem by connecting pairs of elements with an edge when there exists a stable matching in which they are matched. Our results include the NP-completeness of recognizing…
Consider a random graph model where each possible edge $e$ is present independently with some probability $p_e$. Given these probabilities, we want to build a large/heavy matching in the randomly generated graph. However, the only way we…
We study the {\em maximum duo-preservation string mapping} ({\sc Max-Duo}) problem, which is the complement of the well studied {\em minimum common string partition} ({\sc MCSP}) problem. Both problems have applications in many fields…
We study the stable marriage problem in the partial information setting where the agents, although they have an underlying true strict linear order, are allowed to specify partial orders. Specifically, we focus on the case where the agents…
We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…
Let $G$ be a bipartite graph where every node has a strict ranking of its neighbors. For every node, its preferences over neighbors extend naturally to preferences over matchings. Matching $N$ is more popular than matching $M$ if the number…
We consider an extension of the {\em popular matching} problem in this paper. The input to the popular matching problem is a bipartite graph G = (A U B,E), where A is a set of people, B is a set of items, and each person a belonging to A…
Graph alignment aims at finding the vertex correspondence between two correlated graphs, a task that frequently occurs in graph mining applications such as social network analysis. Attributed graph alignment is a variant of graph alignment,…
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…
In the Maximum Duo-Preservation String Mapping problem we are given two strings and wish to map the letters of the former to the letters of the latter so as to maximise the number of duos. A duo is a pair of consecutive letters that is…
We study (coalitional) exchange stability, which Alcalde [Economic Design, 1995] introduced as an alternative solution concept for matching markets involving property rights, such as assigning persons to two-bed rooms. Here, a matching of a…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…
We study ex-post fairness in the object allocation problem where objects are valuable and commonly owned. A matching is fair from individual perspective if it has only inevitable envy towards agents who received most preferred objects --…