Related papers: Bayesian hypergame approach to equilibrium stabili…

Consider an analyst who models a strategic situation using an incomplete information game. The true game may involve correlated, duplicated belief hierarchies, but the analyst lacks knowledge of the correlation structure and can only…

In this paper, we consider a distributed Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in incomplete-information aggregative games, which is a generalization of Bayesian games and deterministic aggregative games. We handle the aggregation…

We consider finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of a dynamic game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov…

In this paper, we employ a hypergame framework to analyze the single-leader-multiple-followers (SLMF) Stackelberg security game with two typical misinformed situations: misperception and deception. We provide a stability criterion with the…

Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty regarding…

We present a moving target defense strategy to reduce the impact of stealthy sensor attacks on feedback systems. The defender periodically and randomly switches between thresholds from a discrete set to increase the uncertainty for the…

Empirically, many strategic settings are characterized by stable outcomes in which players' decisions are publicly observed, yet no player takes the opportunity to deviate. To analyze such situations in the presence of incomplete…

In dynamic games with asymmetric information structure, the widely used concept of equilibrium is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). This is expressed as a strategy and belief pair that simultaneously satisfy sequential rationality and…

In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…

This paper investigates strategic interactions within a three party deception security game involving a defender, an insider, and external attackers. We propose a robust deception mechanism where the leader manipulates game parameters…

We present a new model of incomplete information games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with the payoff uncertainty. With some specific restrictions, we show that…

This paper investigates how an autonomous agent can transmit information through its motion in an adversarial setting. We consider scenarios where an agent must reach its goal while deceiving an intelligent observer about its destination.…

We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…

We study a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where agents' beliefs are strategy dependent, i.e. signaling occurs. We show that the notion of sufficient information, introduced in the companion paper team, can be…

In security games, the solution concept commonly used is that of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the defender gets to commit to a mixed strategy. The motivation for this is that the attacker can repeatedly observe the defender's actions and…

Security challenges accompany the efficiency. The pervasive integration of information and communications technologies (ICTs) makes cyber-physical systems vulnerable to targeted attacks that are deceptive, persistent, adaptive and…

In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…

The field of cybersecurity has mostly been a cat-and-mouse game with the discovery of new attacks leading the way. To take away an attacker's advantage of reconnaissance, researchers have proposed proactive defense methods such as Moving…

Multi-defender Stackelberg Security Games (MSSG) have recently gained increasing attention in the literature. However, the solutions offered to date are highly sensitive, wherein even small perturbations in the attacker's utility or slight…