Related papers: Static Nuel Games with Terminal Payoff

This paper addresses a class of network games played by dynamic agents using their outputs. Unlike most existing related works, the Nash equilibrium in this work is defined by functions of agent outputs instead of full agent states, which…

We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure…

We study the complexity of solving two-player infinite duration games played on a fixed finite graph, where the control of a node is not predetermined but rather assigned randomly. In classic random-turn games, control of each node is…

We discuss the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting players in spatial evolutionary games. In particular, we investigate the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash…

In this paper, we investigate the multiplayer General Lotto game across multiple battlefields, a significant variant of the Colonel Blotto game. In this version, each player employs a probability distribution for resource allocation,…

Learning processes in games explain how players grapple with one another in seeking an equilibrium. We study a natural model of learning based on individual gradients in two-player continuous games. In such games, the arguably natural…

The Hotelling game consists of n servers each choosing a point on the line segment, so as to maximize the amount of clients it attracts. Clients are uniformly distributed along the line, and each client buys from the closest server. In this…

Nash equilibrium (NE) is a central concept in game theory. Here we prove formally a published theorem on existence of an NE in two proof assistants, Coq and Isabelle: starting from a game with finitely many outcomes, one may derive a game…

Generating payoff matrices of normal-form games at random, we calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of $n$-player, $m$-strategy games. These are perfectly predictable as they must…

We discuss stochastic dynamics of finite populations of individuals playing games. We review recent results concerning the dependence of the long-run behavior of such systems on the number of players and the noise level. In the case of…

We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…

We consider a game in which each player must find a compromise between more daring strategies that carry a high risk for him to be eliminated, and more cautious ones that, however, reduce his final score. For two symmetric players this game…

We study discrete two player all-pay auction with complete information. We provide full characterization of mixed strategy Nash equilibria and show that they constitute a subset of Nash equilibria of discrete General Lotto game. We show…

This paper studies the last-iterate convergence properties of the exponential weights algorithm with constant learning rates. We consider a repeated interaction in discrete time, where each player uses an exponential weights algorithm…

We carry out a game-theoretic analysis of the recursive game "Guts," a variant of poker featuring repeated play with possibly growing stakes. An interesting aspect of such games is the need to account for funds lost to all players if…

We consider a tournament among four equally strong semifinalists. The players have to decide how much stamina to use in the semifinals, provided that the rest is available in the final and the third-place playoff. We investigate optimal…

In this paper, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a multi-player game is considered. The players are only aware of their own cost functions as well as the action space of all players. We develop a relatively fast algorithm within…

We study a simple adaptive model in the framework of an N -player normal form game. The model consists of a repeated game where the players only know their own action space and their own payoff scored at each stage, not those of the other…

Evolutionary game theory is a framework to formalize the evolution of collectives ("populations") of competing agents that are playing a game and, after every round, update their strategies to maximize individual payoffs. There are two…

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…