Related papers: Static Nuel Games with Terminal Payoff
In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in…
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic…
The "War of Attrition" is a classical game theoretic model that was first introduced to mathematically describe certain non-violent animal behavior. The original setup considers two participating players in a one-shot game competing for a…
We study the problem of deciding the winner of reachability switching games for zero-, one-, and two-player variants. Switching games provide a deterministic analogue of stochastic games. We show that the zero-player case is NL-hard, the…
This paper presents a new primal-dual method for computing an equilibrium of generalized (continuous) Nash game (referred to as generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP)) where each player's feasible strategy set depends on the other…
A classic model to study strategic decision making in multi-agent systems is the normal-form game. This model can be generalised to allow for an infinite number of pure strategies leading to continuous games. Multi-objective normal-form…
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…
In this paper, we study the problem of learning the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria and the exact structure of a continuous-action graphical game with quadratic payoffs by observing a small set of perturbed equilibria. A…
We revisit the game in which each of several players chooses a pattern and then a coin is flipped repeatedly until one of these patterns is generated. In particular, we demonstrate how to compute the probability of any one player winning…
We introduce a stochastic learning process called the dampened gradient approximation process. While learning models have almost exclusively focused on finite games, in this paper we design a learning process for games with continuous…
Voting by sequential elimination is a low-communication voting protocol: voters play in sequence and eliminate one or more of the remaining candidates, until only one remains. While the fairness and efficiency of such protocols have been…
We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria where no…
We investigate mean-field games from the point of view of a large number of indistinguishable players which eventually converges to infinity. The players are weakly coupled via their empirical measure. The dynamics of the states of the…
In this work, we study the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for monotone generalized noncooperative games with set constraints and shared affine inequality constraints. A distributed regularized penalty method is proposed. The…
We propose a general class of symmetric games called position-optimization games. Given a probability distribution $Q$ over a set of targets $\mathcal{Y}$, the $n$ players each choose a position in a space $\mathcal{X}$. A player's utility…
Let A be a finite subset of $\nat$. Then NIM(A;n) is the following 2-player game: initially there are $n$ stones on the board and the players alternate removing $a\in A$ stones. The first player who cannot move loses. This game has been…
We consider a game in which players are the vertices of a directed graph. Initially, Nature chooses one player according to some fixed distribution and gives her a buck, which represents the request to perform a chore. After completing the…
This paper is dealing with another multiple person game model under the antagonistic duel type setup. The most flexible multiple person duel game is analytically solved and the explicit formulas are solved to determine the time dependent…
This paper analyzes the structure of mixed-strategy equilibria for Colonel Blotto games, where the outcome on each battlefield is a polynomial function of the difference between the two players' allocations. This paper severely reduces the…
We develop a probabilistic approach to continuous-time finite state mean field games. Based on an alternative description of continuous-time Markov chain by means of semimartingale and the weak formulation of stochastic optimal control, our…