A Partial Solution to Continuous Blotto
Economics
2017-09-15 v2 Computer Science and Game Theory
General Topology
Abstract
This paper analyzes the structure of mixed-strategy equilibria for Colonel Blotto games, where the outcome on each battlefield is a polynomial function of the difference between the two players' allocations. This paper severely reduces the set of strategies that needs to be searched to find a Nash equilibrium. It finds that there exists a Nash equilibrium where both players' mixed strategies are discrete distributions, and it places an upper bound on the number of points in the supports of these discrete distributions.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1706.08479,
title = {A Partial Solution to Continuous Blotto},
author = {Kostyantyn Mazur},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.08479},
year = {2017}
}
Comments
This paper cites and relies on another paper, arXiv1706.02060 "Convex Hull of (t, t^2, ..., t^N)", that is posted on arXiv at the same time as this paper Version 2: added a reference