Related papers: Phase error rate estimation in QKD with imperfect …
Information-theoretical security of quantum key distribution (QKD) has been convincingly proven in recent years and remarkable experiments have shown the potential of QKD for real world applications. Due to its unique capability of…
Decoy state method closes source security loophole in quantum key distribution (QKD) using laser source. In this method, accurate estimates of the detection rates of vacuum and single photon events plus the error rate of single photon…
We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the source and detector are under the limited control of an adversary. Our proof applies when both the source and the detector have…
Detection-efficiency mismatch is a common problem in practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Current security proofs of QKD with detection-efficiency mismatch rely either on the assumption of the single-photon light source on the…
We demonstrate a practical countermeasure against a well-known class of attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems that exploit detection efficiency mismatch, where the receiver's detectors do not exhibit identical responses to…
In this work, we incorporate decoy-state analysis into a well-established numerical framework for key rate calculation, and apply the numerical framework to decoy-state BB84 and measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD protocols as…
Variations of phase-matching measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (PM-MDI QKD) protocols have been investigated before, but it was recently discovered that this type of protocol (under the name of twin-field QKD) can beat…
The performance of a QKD implementation is determined by the tightness of the underlying security analysis. In particular, the security analyses determines the key-rate, i.e., the amount of cryptographic key material that can be distributed…
We review the current status of security proofs for practical decoy-state Quantum Key Distribution using the BB84 protocol, focusing on optical implementations with weak coherent pulses and threshold photodetectors. The primary aim of this…
In the original BB84 protocol, the bit basis and the phase basis are used with equal probability. Lo et al (J. of Cryptology, 18, 133-165 (2005)) proposed to modify the ratio between the two bases by increasing the final key generation…
The BB84 QKD protocol is based on the idea that the sender and the receiver can reconcile a certain fraction of the teleported qubits to detect eavesdropping or noise and decode the rest to use as a private key. Under the present hardware…
Practical QKD modulators introduce correlations between consecutively emitted pulses due to bandwidth limitations, violating key assumptions underlying many security proof techniques. Here, we address this problem by introducing a simple…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) based on coherent states is well known for its implementation simplicity, but it suffers from loss-dependent attacks based on optimal unambiguous state discrimination. Crucially, previous research has…
In optical implementations of the phase-encoded BB84 protocol, the bit information is usually encoded in the phase of two consecutive photon pulses generated in a Mach-Zehnder interferometer. In the actual experimental realization, the loss…
The phase randomized light is one of the key assumptions in the security proof of Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol implemented with an attenuated laser. Though the assumption has been believed to be…
In practical quantum key distribution (QKD) system, the state preparation and measurement are imperfect comparing with the ideal BB84 protocol, which are always state-dependent in practical realizations. If the state-dependent imperfections…
In recent years, quantum key distribution (QKD) has evolved from a scientific research field to a commercially available security solution, supported by mathematically formulated security proofs. However, since the knowledge required for a…
We consider the security of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), in the presence of bit and basis dependent detector flaws. We suggest a powerful attack that can be used in systems with detector…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can share an unconditional secure key between two remote parties, but the deviation between theory and practice will break the security of the generated key. In this paper, we evaluate the security of QKD with…
Imperfect bit-and-basis encoders compromise the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems via modulation flaws, side channels and inter-pulse correlations, which invalidate standard security proofs. Existing results addressing such…