Security of quantum key distribution with bit and basis dependent detector flaws
Quantum Physics
2010-01-04 v4
Abstract
We consider the security of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), in the presence of bit and basis dependent detector flaws. We suggest a powerful attack that can be used in systems with detector efficiency mismatch, even if the detector assignments are chosen randomly by Bob. A security proof is provided, valid for any basis dependent, possibly lossy, linear optical imperfections in the channel/receiver/detectors. The proof does not assume the so-called squashing detector model.
Cite
@article{arxiv.0807.0767,
title = {Security of quantum key distribution with bit and basis dependent detector flaws},
author = {L. Lydersen and J. Skaar},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:0807.0767},
year = {2010}
}
Comments
10 pages, 4 figures; v4: rewritten for clarity