Related papers: Optimal Strategy in the Werewolf Game: A Theoretic…
We study a variation of the minority game. There are N agents. Each has to choose between one of two alternatives everyday, and there is reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents cannot communicate with each other, but try to…
We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…
In the classical prophet inequality, a gambler faces a sequence of items, whose values are drawn independently from known distributions. Upon the arrival of each item, its value is realized and the gambler either accepts it and the game…
We consider finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of a dynamic game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov…
Yahtzee is a classic dice game with a stochastic, combinatorial structure and delayed rewards, making it an interesting mid-scale RL benchmark. While an optimal policy for solitaire Yahtzee can be computed using dynamic programming methods,…
Planning safe robot motions in the presence of humans requires reliable forecasts of future human motion. However, simply predicting the most likely motion from prior interactions does not guarantee safety. Such forecasts fail to model the…
This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…
In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…
We consider a game-theoretic setting to model the interplay between attacker and defender in the context of information flow, and to reason about their optimal strategies. In contrast with standard game theory, in our games the utility of a…
This paper presents a model of multi-group Bayesian games (MBGs) to describe the group behavior in Bayesian games, and gives methods to find (strongly) multi-group Bayesian Nash equilibria (MBNE) of this model with a proposed…
We study an independent best-response dynamics on network games in which the nodes (players) decide to revise their strategies independently with some probability. We provide several bounds on the convergence time to an equilibrium as a…
This paper develops a game-theoretic framework for the design and analysis of a new class of incentive schemes called intervention schemes. We formulate intervention games, propose a solution concept of intervention equilibrium, and prove…
This paper aims to solve the optimal strategy against a well-known adaptive algorithm, the Hedge algorithm, in a finitely repeated $2\times 2$ zero-sum game. In the literature, related theoretical results are very rare. To this end, we make…
We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…
We consider the problem of a learning agent who has to repeatedly play a general sum game against a strategic opponent who acts to maximize their own payoff by optimally responding against the learner's algorithm. The learning agent knows…
Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…
We study a multi-agent decision problem in population games, where agents select from multiple available strategies and continually revise their selections based on the payoffs associated with these strategies. Unlike conventional…
We consider any network environment in which the "best shot game" is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors play 0. A…
We study variants of a stochastic game inspired by backgammon where players may propose to double the stake, with the game state dictated by a one-dimensional random walk. Our variants allow for different numbers of proposals and different…
Achieving Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) requires AI agents that can not only make stratigic decisions but also engage in flexible and meaningful communication. Inspired by Wittgenstein's language game theory in Philosophical…