Related papers: Stable matchings, choice functions, and linear ord…
The stable allocation problem is one of the broadest extensions of the well-known stable marriage problem. In an allocation problem, edges of a bipartite graph have capacities and vertices have quotas to fill. Here we investigate the case…
An $(s,t)$-matching in a bipartite graph $G=(U,V,E)$ is a subset of the edges $F$ such that each component of $G[F]$ is a tree with at most $t$ edges and each vertex in $U$ has $s$ neighbours in $G[H]$. We give sharp conditions for a…
We consider the problem of embedding a dynamic network, to obtain time-evolving vector representations of each node, which can then be used to describe changes in behaviour of individual nodes, communities, or the entire graph. Given this…
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matchings exist in a discrete…
We show that given a SM instance G as input we can find a largest collection of pairwise edge-disjoint stable matchings of G in time linear in the input size. This extends two classical results: 1. The Gale-Shapley algorithm, which can find…
In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…
In this paper we study the main characteristics of some evaluation codes parameterized by the edges of a bipartite graph with a perfect matching.
We consider the problem of finding all allowed edges in a bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$, i.e., all edges that are included in some maximum matching. We show that given any maximum matching in the graph, it is possible to perform this…
We generalize several schedule matching theorems of Baiou-Balinski (Math. Oper. Res., 27 (2002), 485) and Alkan-Gale (J. Econ. Th. 112 (2003), 289) by applying a fixed point method of Fleiner (Math. Oper. Res., 28 (2003), 103). Thanks to a…
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a…
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also have the right to…
Let G=(V,E) be a graph. A vertex dominates itself and all its neighbors, i.e., every vertex v in V dominates its closed neighborhood N[v]. A vertex set D in G is an efficient dominating (e.d.) set for G if for every vertex v in V, there is…
We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization…
This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms'…
The paper consider an equivalence relation in the set of vertices of a bipartite graph. Some numerical characteristics showing the cardinality of equivalence classes are introduced. A combinatorial identity that is in relationship to these…
A matching queue is described via a graph $G$ together with a matching policy. Specifically, to each node in the graph there is a corresponding arrival process of items which can either be queued, or matched with queued items in neighboring…
Consider the group of $n$ men and $n$ women, each with their own preference list for a potential marriage partner. The stable marriage is a bipartite matching such that no unmatched pair (man, woman) prefer each other to their partners in…
Typical graph embeddings may not capture type-specific bipartite graph features that arise in such areas as recommender systems, data visualization, and drug discovery. Machine learning methods utilized in these applications would be better…
We study two-stage bipartite matching, in which the edges of a bipartite graph on vertices $(B_1 \cup B_2, I)$ are revealed in two batches. In stage one, a matching must be selected from among revealed edges $E \subseteq B_1 \times I$. In…