Related papers: Temporal Elections: Welfare, Strategyproofness, an…
Participatory budgeting (PB) has been widely adopted and has attracted significant research efforts; however, there is a lack of mechanisms for PB which elicit project interactions, such as substitution and complementarity, from voters.…
In this paper, we study non-obvious manipulability (NOM), a relaxed form of strategyproofness, in the context of Hedonic Games (HGs) with Friends Appreciation (FA) preferences. In HGs, the aim is to partition agents into coalitions…
We study online temporal voting, where a group of voters submit 0/1 approvals on sets of alternatives that arrive online over multiple rounds and a single alternative is chosen in each round. We introduce online variants of two well-known…
We study episodic reinforcement learning (RL) in non-stationary linear kernel Markov decision processes (MDPs). In this setting, both the reward function and the transition kernel are linear with respect to the given feature maps and are…
Consider the the problem of maximizing the relative social welfare of truthful single-winner voting schemes with cardinal preferences compared to the classical range voting scheme. The range voting scheme is a simple and straightforward…
Two important requirements when aggregating the preferences of multiple agents are that the outcome should be economically efficient and the aggregation mechanism should not be manipulable. In this paper, we provide a computer-aided proof…
Rational verification refers to the problem of checking which temporal logic properties hold of a concurrent multiagent system, under the assumption that agents in the system choose strategies that form a game-theoretic equilibrium.…
Motivated by the success of the serial dictatorship mechanism in social choice settings, we explore its usefulness in tackling various combinatorial optimization problems. We do so by considering an abstract model, in which a set of agents…
We examine the complexity of computing welfare- and revenue-maximizing equilibria in autobidding second-price auctions subject to return-on-spend (RoS) constraints. We show that computing an autobidding equilibrium that approximates the…
It is often beneficial for agents to pool their resources in order to better accommodate fluctuations in individual demand. Many multi-round resource allocation mechanisms operate in an online manner: in each round, the agents specify their…
Partitioning a set of $n$ items or agents while maximizing the value of the partition is a fundamental algorithmic task. We study this problem in the specific setting of maximizing social welfare in additively separable hedonic games.…
Computational and economic results suggest that social welfare maximization and combinatorial auction design are much easier when bidders' valuations satisfy the "gross substitutes" condition. The goal of this paper is to evaluate…
We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure…
We consider the problem of allocating a set of divisible goods to $N$ agents in an online manner, aiming to maximize the Nash social welfare, a widely studied objective which provides a balance between fairness and efficiency. The goods…
In this paper, we present new results on the fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods to agents whose preferences correspond to {\em matroid rank functions}. This is a versatile valuation class with several desirable properties…
To choose a suitable multiwinner voting rule is a hard and ambiguous task. Depending on the context, it varies widely what constitutes the choice of an ``optimal'' subset of alternatives. In this paper, we provide a quantitative analysis of…
Voting by sequential elimination is a low-communication voting protocol: voters play in sequence and eliminate one or more of the remaining candidates, until only one remains. While the fairness and efficiency of such protocols have been…
This paper focuses on managing the cost of deliberation before action. In many problems, the overall quality of the solution reflects costs incurred and resources consumed in deliberation as well as the cost and benefit of execution, when…
We study a sequential decision-making model where a set of items is repeatedly matched to the same set of agents over multiple rounds. The objective is to determine a sequence of matchings that either maximizes the utility of the least…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible items to $n$ agents to maximize the utilitarian social welfare, where the fairness criterion is envy-free up to one item and there are only two different utility functions shared by the agents. We…