Related papers: Contested Logistics: A Game-Theoretic Approach

In a competitive game scenario, a set of agents have to learn decisions that maximize their goals and minimize their adversaries' goals at the same time. Besides dealing with the increased dynamics of the scenarios due to the opponents'…

We consider a system of single- or double integrator agents playing a generalized Nash game over a network, in a partial-information scenario. We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem by designing a fully-distributed…

A recurring theme in recent computer science literature is that proper design of signaling schemes is a crucial aspect of effective mechanisms aiming to optimize social welfare or revenue. One of the research endeavors of this line of work…

Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium.…

In this paper we consider strategic cost sharing games with so-called arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems, such as vertex and set cover, facility location, and network design problems. We concentrate on…

We are concerned with finding Nash Equilibria in agent-based multi-cluster games, where agents are separated into distinct clusters. While the agents inside each cluster collaborate to achieve a common goal, the clusters are considered to…

Noticing that physical limitations are ubiquitous in practical engineering systems, this paper considers Nash equilibrium seeking for games in systems where the control inputs are bounded. More specifically, first-order integrator-type…

In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we study the design of incentives so that a desirable equilibrium is obtained, for instance,…

We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, where the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy augmented by a fixed non-negative bonus for picking a given…

This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…

In this paper, we consider a mobility system of travelers and providers, and propose a "mobility game" to study when a traveler is matched to a provider. Each traveler seeks to travel using the services of only one provider, who manages one…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world scenarios where they may lack sufficient information to complete a given task. In such settings, the ability to actively seek out missing information becomes a critical…

We study the traffic routing game among a large number of selfish drivers over a traffic network. We consider a specific scenario where the strategic drivers can be classified into teams, where drivers in the same team have identical payoff…

Matrix games constitute a fundamental problem of game theory and describe a situation of two players with completely conflicting interests. We show how methods from statistical mechanics can be used to investigate the statistical properties…

We consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria in potential games where each player's strategy set is subject to private uncoupled constraints. This scenario is frequently encountered in real-world applications like road network…

A classic model to study strategic decision making in multi-agent systems is the normal-form game. This model can be generalised to allow for an infinite number of pure strategies leading to continuous games. Multi-objective normal-form…

This paper investigates the impact of perturbations on the best-response-based algorithms approximating Nash equilibria in zero-sum games, namely Double Oracle and Fictitious Play. More precisely, we assume that the oracle computing the…

The game-theoretic risk management framework put forth in the precursor work "Towards a Theory of Games with Payoffs that are Probability-Distributions" (arXiv:1506.07368 [q-fin.EC]) is herein extended by algorithmic details on how to…

This paper considers a class of noncooperative games in which the feasible decision sets of all players are coupled together by a coupled inequality constraint. Adopting the variational inequality formulation of the game, we first introduce…

We consider the classic motion planning problem defined over a roadmap in which a vehicle seeks to find an optimal path from a source to a destination in presence of an attacker who can launch attacks on the vehicle over any edge of the…