Related papers: Abductive and Contrastive Explanations for Scoring…

The main idea of the {\em distance rationalizability} approach to view the voters' preferences as an imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus is deeply rooted in social choice literature. It allows one to define ("rationalize")…

It is well known that reinforcement learning can be cast as inference in an appropriate probabilistic model. However, this commonly involves introducing a distribution over agent trajectories with probabilities proportional to exponentiated…

Many proofs in discrete mathematics and theoretical computer science are based on the probabilistic method. To prove the existence of a good object, we pick a random object and show that it is bad with low probability. This method is…

Computational preference elicitation methods are tools used to learn people's preferences quantitatively in a given context. Recent works on preference elicitation advocate for active learning as an efficient method to iteratively construct…

Consider the decision-making setting where agents elect a panel by expressing both positive and negative preferences. Prominently, in constitutional AI, citizens democratically select a slate of ethical preferences on which a foundation…

Committee scoring voting rules are multiwinner analogues of positional scoring rules which constitute an important subclass of single-winner voting rules. We identify several natural subclasses of committee scoring rules, namely, weakly…

Bribery in election (or computational social choice in general) is an important problem that has received a considerable amount of attention. In the classic bribery problem, the briber (or attacker) bribes some voters in attempting to make…

To understand and summarize approval preferences and other binary evaluation data, it is useful to order the items on an axis which explains the data. In a political election using approval voting, this could be an ideological left-right…

This paper maps out the relation between different approaches for handling preferences in argumentation with strict rules and defeasible assumptions by offering translations between them. The systems we compare are: non-prioritized defeats…

Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or disapprove candidates. In this setting, several voting rules…

Rule-based explanations provide simple reasons explaining the behavior of machine learning classifiers at given points in the feature space. Several recent methods (Anchors, LORE, etc.) purport to generate rule-based explanations for…

While proportionality is frequently named as a desirable property of voting rules, its interpretation in multiwinner voting differs significantly from that in apportionment. We aim to bridge these two distinct notions of proportionality by…

Transformers have recently been shown to be capable of reliably performing logical reasoning over facts and rules expressed in natural language, but abductive reasoning - inference to the best explanation of an unexpected observation - has…

When making simultaneous decisions, our preference for the outcomes on one subset can depend on the outcomes on a disjoint subset. In referendum elections, this gives rise to the separability problem, where a voter must predict the outcome…

Voting rules based on evaluation inputs rather than preference orders have been recently proposed, like majority judgement, range voting or approval voting. Traditionally, probabilistic analysis of voting rules supposes the use of…

{\em Distortion} is a well-established notion for quantifying the loss of social welfare that may occur in voting. As voting rules take as input only ordinal information, they are essentially forced to neglect the exact values the agents…

Voting is the aggregation of individual preferences in order to select a winning alternative. Selection of a winner is accomplished via a voting rule, e.g., rank-order voting, majority rule, plurality rule, approval voting. Which voting…

It is important to study how strategic agents can affect the outcome of an election. There has been a long line of research in the computational study of elections on the complexity of manipulative actions such as manipulation and bribery.…

We investigate approval-based committee voting with incomplete information about the approval preferences of voters. We consider several models of incompleteness where each voter partitions the set of candidates into approved, disapproved,…

In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret,…