Related papers: Distributed Stackelberg Strategies in State-based …
The community in the future may develop into an integrated heat-power system, which includes a high proportion of renewable energy, power generator units, heat generator units, and shared hybrid energy storage. In the integrated heat-power…
We study decentralized equilibrium selection in stochastic games under severe information and communication constraints. In such settings, convergence to equilibrium alone is insufficient, as stochastic games typically admit many equilibria…
Synthesizing near-optimal mixed strategies for zero-sum differential games (ZSDGs) has been a longstanding challenge. Existing research mainly focuses on characterizing the theoretical value function, while the practical design of…
We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…
Inspired by a military context, we study a Stackelberg production game where a country's government, the leader, wants to maximize the production of military assets. The leader does so by allocating his resources among a set of production…
In this paper, we are concerned with the stabilizatbility of Stackelberg game-based systems. In particular, two players are involved in the system where one is the follower to minimize the related cost function and the other is the leader…
In this paper, we consider a sequential stochastic Stackelberg game with two players, a leader and a follower. The follower has access to the state of the system while the leader does not. Assuming that the players act in their respective…
User-behavior-aware communications will be a key feature of future generation cellular networks, so user experience is enhanced with greater benefit to users. In this paper, a user-behavior-aware Stackelberg (U-BeAS) game for…
In many settings of interest, a policy is set by one party, the leader, in order to influence the action of another party, the follower, where the follower's response is determined by some private information. A natural question to ask is,…
Stochastic games combine controllable and adversarial non-determinism with stochastic behavior and are a common tool in control, verification and synthesis of reactive systems facing uncertainty. Multi-objective stochastic games are natural…
Leader-follower general-sum stochastic games (LF-GSSGs) model sequential decision-making under asymmetric commitment, where a leader commits to a policy and a follower best responds, yielding a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) with…
We study the stochastic assignment game and extend it to model multimodal mobility markets with a regulator or a Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) platform. We start by presenting general forms of one-to-one and many-to-many stochastic…
In the context of reducing carbon emissions in the automotive supply chain, collaboration between vehicle manufacturers and retailers has proven to be an effective measure for enhancing carbon emission reduction within the enterprise. This…
This paper focuses on multi-stage coordination for a population of thermostatically controlled loads (TCL). Each load maximizes the individual utility in response to an energy price, while the coordinator determines the price to maximize…
Stochastic games combine controllable and adversarial non-determinism with stochastic behavior and are a common tool in control, verification and synthesis of reactive systems facing uncertainty. Multi-objective stochastic games are natural…
By utilizing tools from game theory, we develop a novel multi-period-multi-company demand response framework considering the interactions between companies (sellers of energy) and their consumers (buyers of energy). We model the…
This paper studies a nonlinear open-loop mean field Stackelberg stochastic differential game by using the probabilistic method through the FBSDE system and the idea of taking control as the fixed point. We successively construct the…
Prior work has studied the computational complexity of computing optimal strategies to commit to in Stackelberg or leadership games, where a leader commits to a strategy which is observed by one or more followers. We extend this setting to…
In a Stackelberg congestion game (SCG), a leader aims to maximize their own gain by anticipating and manipulating the equilibrium state at which the followers settle by playing a congestion game. Often formulated as bilevel programs,…
This paper introduces a systematic methodological framework to design and analyze distributed algorithms for optimization and games over networks. Starting from a centralized method, we identify an aggregation function involving all the…