Related papers: A Stackelberg Game Model of Flocking
In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…
We study the problem of designing autonomous agents that can learn to cooperate effectively with a potentially suboptimal partner while having no access to the joint reward function. This problem is modeled as a cooperative episodic…
This paper aims to balance performance and cost in a two-hop wireless cooperative communication network where the source and relays have contradictory optimization goals and make decisions in a distributed manner. This differs from most…
This article considers a problem arising from a two-player game based on the classical secretary problem. First, Player 1 selects one object from a sequence as in the secretary problem. All of the other objects are then presented to Player…
Stackelberg games originate where there are market leaders and followers, and the actions of leaders influence the behavior of the followers. Mathematical modelling of such games results in what's called a Bilevel Optimization problem.…
We study a two-player dynamic Stackelberg game where the follower's intention is unknown to the leader. Classical formulations of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) assume that the follower's best response (BR) function is known to the…
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time Stackelberg mean field game with a leader and an infinite number of followers. The leader and the followers each observe types privately that evolve as conditionally independent controlled Markov…
From a perspective of designing or engineering for opinion formation games in social networks, the "opinion maximization (or minimization)" problem has been studied mainly for designing subset selecting algorithms. We define a two-player…
Stackelberg planning is a recently introduced single-turn two-player adversarial planning model, where two players are acting in a joint classical planning task, the objective of the first player being hampering the second player from…
In cooperative games, we study how values created or costs incurred by a coalition are shared among the members within it, and the players may join the coalition in a online manner such as investors invest a startup. Recently, Ge et al.…
We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of $m$ priceable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader's decision one or more…
Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty regarding…
Merging in the form of a mandatory lane-change is an important issue in transportation research. Even when safely completed, merging may disturb the mainline traffic and reduce the efficiency or capacity of the roadway. In this paper, we…
Designing socially optimal policies in multi-agent environments is a fundamental challenge in both economics and artificial intelligence. This paper studies a general framework for learning Stackelberg equilibria in dynamic and uncertain…
Existing methods for learning Stackelberg equilibria typically assume that the followers' (variational, generalized) Nash equilibrium is unique. However, in the presence of multiple equilibria, without a selection convention, the problem…
Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable…
A Stackelberg game is played between a leader and a follower. The leader first chooses an action, then the follower plays his best response. The goal of the leader is to pick the action that will maximize his payoff given the follower's…
Effectively predicting intent and behavior requires inferring leadership in multi-agent interactions. Dynamic games provide an expressive theoretical framework for modeling these interactions. Employing this framework, we propose a novel…
We consider Stackelberg pricing games, which are also known as bilevel pricing problems, or combinatorial price-setting problems. This family of problems consists of games between two players: the leader and the follower. There is a market…
This paper studies game-theoretic decision-making for autonomous vehicles (AVs). A receding horizon multi-player game is formulated to model the AV decision-making problem. Two classes of games, including Nash game and Stackelber games, are…