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Auctions are modeled as Bayesian games with continuous type and action spaces. Determining equilibria in auction games is computationally hard in general and no exact solution theory is known. We introduce an algorithmic framework in which…
We apply control theoretic and optimization techniques to adaptively design incentives. In particular, we consider the problem of a planner with an objective that depends on data from strategic decision makers. The planner does not know the…
We investigate the model of multiple contests held in parallel, where each contestant selects one contest to join and each contest designer decides the prize structure to compete for the participation of contestants. We first analyze the…
Incentives are more likely to elicit desired outcomes when they are designed based on accurate models of agents' strategic behavior. A growing literature, however, suggests that people do not quite behave like standard economic agents in a…
Decision making in modern large-scale and complex systems such as communication networks, smart electricity grids, and cyber-physical systems motivate novel game-theoretic approaches. This paper investigates big strategic (non-cooperative)…
Bargaining networks model the behavior of a set of players that need to reach pairwise agreements for making profits. Nash bargaining solutions are special outcomes of such games that are both stable and balanced. Kleinberg and Tardos…
Prediction is a well-studied machine learning task, and prediction algorithms are core ingredients in online products and services. Despite their centrality in the competition between online companies who offer prediction-based products,…
Mechanism design is studied for aggregating renewable power producers (RPPs) in a two-settlement power market. Employing an indirect mechanism design framework, a payoff allocation mechanism (PAM) is derived from the competitive equilibrium…
This paper analyzes a class of Stackelberg games where different actors compete for shared resources and a central authority tries to balance the demand through a pricing mechanism. Situations like this can for instance occur when fleet…
In this paper, the problem of smart grid energy management under stochastic dynamics is investigated. In the considered model, at the demand side, it is assumed that customers can act as prosumers who own renewable energy sources and can…
In this paper, we consider a network of consumers who are under the combined influence of their neighbors and external influencing entities (the marketers). The consumers' opinion follows a hybrid dynamics whose opinion jumps are due to the…
Sharing economy is a distributed peer-to-peer economic paradigm, which gives rise to a variety of social interactions for economic purposes. One fundamental distributed decision-making process is coalition formation for sharing certain…
An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of…
In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex…
We propose a generalization of the Bass diffusion model in discrete-time that explicitly models the effect of price in adoption. Our model is different from earlier price-incorporated models and fits well to adoption data for various…
A growing line of work reframes preference-based fine-tuning of large language models game-theoretically: Nash Learning from Human Feedback (NLHF) recasts the problem as a zero-sum game over policies. However, optimization is over expected…
We formulate two-party policy competition as a two-player non-cooperative game, generalizing Lin et al.'s work (2021). Each party selects a real-valued policy vector as its strategy from a compact subset of Euclidean space, and a voter's…
The design of energy markets is a subject of ongoing debate, particularly concerning the choice between the widely adopted Pay-as-Clear (PC) pricing mechanism and the alternative Pay-as-Bid (PB). These mechanisms determine how energy…
We study the complexity of several combinatorial problems in the model of binary networked public goods games. In this game, players are represented by vertices in a network, and the action of each player can be either investing or not…
Machine learning relies on the assumption that unseen test instances of a classification problem follow the same distribution as observed training data. However, this principle can break down when machine learning is used to make important…