Related papers: Competitive Query Minimization for Stable Matching…
In this work, we study the multi-agent assortment optimization problem in the two-sided sequential matching model introduced by Ashlagi et al. (2022). The setting is the following: we (the platform) offer a menu of suppliers to each…
The classic two-sided many-to-one job matching model assumes that firms treat workers as substitutes and workers ignore colleagues when choosing where to work. Relaxing these assumptions may lead to nonexistence of stable matchings.…
Two-sided manufacturing-as-a-service (MaaS) marketplaces connect clients requesting manufacturing services to suppliers providing those services. Matching mechanisms i.e. allocation of clients' orders to suppliers is a key design parameter…
Conflicts of interest often arise between data sources and their users regarding how the users' information needs should be interpreted by the data source. For example, an online product search might be biased towards presenting certain…
We improve the best known competitive ratio (from 1/4 to 1/2), for the online multi-unit allocation problem, where the objective is to maximize the single-price revenue. Moreover, the competitive ratio of our algorithm tends to 1, as the…
This paper deals with solving distributed optimization problems with equality constraints by a class of uncertain nonlinear heterogeneous dynamic multi-agent systems. It is assumed that each agent with an uncertain dynamic model has limited…
We analyze the problem of identifying large cliques in graphs that are affected by adversarial uncertainty. More specifically, we consider a new formulation, namely the adversarial maximum clique problem, which extends the classical…
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…
The standard two-sided and one-sided matching problems, and the closely related school choice problem, have been widely studied from an axiomatic viewpoint. A small number of algorithms dominate the literature. For two-sided matching, the…
We study the envy-free house allocation problem when agents have uncertain preferences over items and consider several well-studied preference uncertainty models. The central problem that we focus on is computing an allocation that has the…
We formulate and study a general time-varying multi-agent system where players repeatedly compete under incomplete information. Our work is motivated by scenarios commonly observed in online advertising and retail marketplaces, where agents…
In this paper we consider the issue of a unique prediction in one to one two sided matching markets, as defined by Gale and Shapley (1962), and we prove the following. Theorem. Let P be a one-to-one two-sided matching market and let P be…
Consider the object allocation (one-sided matching) model of Shapley and Scarf (1974). When final allocations are observed but agents' preferences are unknown, when might the allocation be in the core? This is a one-sided analogue of the…
We consider a model of stable edge sets (``matchings'') in a bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ in which the preferences for vertices of one side (``firms'') are given via choice functions subject to standard axioms of consistency, substitutability…
A two-sided matching system is considered, where servers are assumed to arrive at a fixed rate, while the arrival rate of customers is modulated via a price-control mechanism. We analyse a loss model, wherein customers who are not served…
Motivated by group-project distribution, we introduce and study stable matching under the constraint of applicants needing to share a location to be matched with the same institute, which we call the Location-Restricted Stable Matching…
Within the context of stochastic probing with commitment, we consider the online stochastic matching problem; that is, the one-sided online bipartite matching problem where edges adjacent to an online node must be probed to determine if…
Many scenarios where agents with restrictions compete for resources can be cast as maximum matching problems on bipartite graphs. Our focus is on resource allocation problems where agents may have restrictions that make them incompatible…
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…
Making an informed decision -- for example, when choosing a career or housing -- requires knowledge about the available options. Such knowledge is generally acquired through costly trial and error, but this learning process can be disrupted…