Related papers: Competitive Query Minimization for Stable Matching…

In the well-studied Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of agents into pairs, where no two agents prefer each other over their assigned partners. However, some instances of this problem are unsolvable, lacking any stable…

Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a…

Problem definition: In many matching markets, some agents are fully flexible, while others only accept a subset of jobs. For example, ridesharing drivers can specify on the platform the destinations they are willing to accept. Conventional…

Roommate problems with convex preferences always have stable matchings. Efficiency and individual rationality are, moreover, compatible with strategyproofness in such convex roommate problems. Both of these results fail without the…

We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to…

The classical Stable Roommates problem is to decide whether there exists a matching of an even number of agents such that no two agents which are not matched to each other would prefer to be with each other rather than with their…

We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of \cite{chambers2017choice} by weakening the path independence assumption. For many-to-many…

Super-stability is one of the stability concepts in the stable matching problem with ties. It is known that there may not exist a super-stable matching, and the existence of a super-stable matching can be checked in polynomial time. In this…

The classical stable marriage problem asks for a matching between a set of men and a set of women with no blocking pairs, which are pairs formed by a man and a woman who would both prefer switching from their current status to be paired up…

I relate bipartite graph matchings to stable matchings. I prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a saturating stable matching, where every agent on one side is matched, for all possible preferences. I extend my…

In many labor markets, workers and firms are connected via affiliative relationships. A management consulting firm wishes to both accept the best new workers but also place its current affiliated workers at strong firms. Similarly, a…

This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family of optimal transport problems. The parameter reflects…

In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…

The area of computing with uncertainty considers problems where some information about the input elements is uncertain, but can be obtained using queries. For example, instead of the weight of an element, we may be given an interval that is…

We extend the standard online worst-case model to accommodate past experience which is available to the online player in many practical scenarios. We do this by revealing a random sample of the adversarial input to the online player ahead…

Stable matching, a classical model for two-sided markets, has long been studied with little consideration for how each side's preferences are learned. With the advent of massive online markets powered by data-driven matching platforms, it…

We consider the stable matching problem when the preference lists are not given explicitly but are represented in a succinct way and ask whether the problem becomes computationally easier and investigate other implications. We give…

We study the problem of capacity modification in the many-to-one stable matching of workers and firms. Our goal is to systematically study how the set of stable matchings changes when some seats are added to or removed from the firms. We…

We focus on an online 2-stage problem, motivated by the following situation: consider a system where students shall be assigned to universities. There is a first round where some students apply, and a first (stable) matching $M_1$ has to be…

We consider the stable assignment problem on a graph with nonnegative real capacities on the edges and quotas on the vertices, in which the preferences of agents are given via diversifying choice functions. We prove that for any input of…