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In this paper, we focus on the control of the mean field equilibrium of non linear networks of the Langevin type in the limit of small noise. Using iterative linear approximations, we derive a formula that prescribes a control strategy in…
Recently, the eco-evolutionary game theory which describes the coupled dynamics of strategies and environment have attracted great attention. At the same time, most of the current work is focused on the classic two-player two-strategy game.…
Which equilibria will arise in signaling games depends on how the receiver interprets deviations from the path of play. We develop a micro-foundation for these off-path beliefs, and an associated equilibrium refinement, in a model where…
We consider ordinary differential equations on the unit simplex of $\RR^n$ that naturally occur in population games, models of learning and self reinforced random processes. Generalizing and relying on an idea introduced in \cite{DF11}, we…
Game dynamics in which three or more strategies are cyclically competitive, as represented by the rock-scissors-paper game, have attracted practical and theoretical interests. In evolutionary dynamics, cyclic competition results in…
We investigate the long-run behavior of a stochastic replicator process, which describes game dynamics for a symmetric two-player game under aggregate shocks. We establish an averaging principle that relates time averages of the process and…
The analysis of equilibrium points in random games has been of great interest in evolutionary game theory, with important implications for understanding of complexity in a dynamical system, such as its behavioural, cultural or biological…
The generalization of the problem of adaptive competition, known as the minority game, to the case of $K$ possible choices for each player is addressed, and applied to a system of interacting perceptrons with input and output units of the…
In this paper, we study inverse game theory (resp. inverse multiagent learning) in which the goal is to find parameters of a game's payoff functions for which the expected (resp. sampled) behavior is an equilibrium. We formulate these…
In this work, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a networked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning…
In this paper, we study a distributed continuous-time design for aggregative games with coupled constraints in order to seek the generalized Nash equilibrium by a group of agents via simple local information exchange. To solve the problem,…
Game theory offers a powerful framework for analyzing strategic interactions among decision-makers, providing tools to model, analyze, and predict their behavior. However, implementing game theory can be challenging due to difficulties in…
The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the…
There has been substantial progress on finding game-theoretic equilibria. Most of that work has focused on games with finite, discrete action spaces. However, many games involving space, time, money, and other fine-grained quantities have…
The governance of common-pool resources has vital importance for sustainability. However, in the realistic management systems of common-pool resources, the institutions do not necessarily execute the management policies completely, which…
Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…
Interactions among individuals in natural populations often occur in a dynamically changing environment. Understanding the role of environmental variation in population dynamics has long been a central topic in theoretical ecology and…
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…
It is well established that humans decision making and instrumental control uses multiple systems, some which use habitual action selection and some which require deliberate planning. Deliberate planning systems use predictions of…
We consider integer-restricted optimal control of systems governed by abstract semilinear evolution equations. This includes the problem of optimal control design for certain distributed parameter systems endowed with multiple actuators,…