Related papers: Welfare-Optimal Serial Dictatorships have Polynomi…
In this paper, we study some multiagent variants of the knapsack problem. Fluschnik et al. [AAAI 2019] considered the model in which every agent assigns some utility to every item. They studied three preference aggregation rules for finding…
I provide a novel approach to characterizing the set of interim realizable allocations, in the spirit of Matthews (1984) and Border (1991). The approach allows me to identify precisely why exact characterizations are difficult to obtain in…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
Many important problems in multiagent systems involve resource allocations. Self-interested agents may lie about their valuations if doing so increases their own utilities. Therefore, it is necessary to design mechanisms (collective…
We study fair mechanisms for the (asymmetric) one-sided allocation problem with m items and n multi-unit demand agents with additive, unit-sum valuations. The symmetric case (m=n), the one-sided matching problem, has been studied…
This paper addresses the collision detection problem in population protocols. The network consists of state machines called agents. At each time step, exactly one pair of agents is chosen uniformly at random to have an interaction, changing…
This paper aims to investigate how a central authority (e.g. a government) can increase social welfare in a network of markets and firms. In these networks, modeled using a bipartite graph, firms compete with each other \textit{\`a la}…
Assignment problems are a classic combinatorial optimization problem in which a group of agents must be assigned to a group of tasks such that maximum utility is achieved while satisfying assignment constraints. Given the utility of each…
A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous software agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In this…
In this work, we study the multi-agent decision problem where agents try to coordinate to optimize a given system-level objective. While solving for the global optimal is intractable in many cases, the greedy algorithm is a well-studied and…
Equitability is a well-studied fairness notion in fair division, where an allocation is equitable if all agents receive equal utility from their allocation. For indivisible items, an exactly equitable allocation may not exist, and a natural…
We study a sequential decision-making model where a set of items is repeatedly matched to the same set of agents over multiple rounds. The objective is to determine a sequence of matchings that either maximizes the utility of the least…
In the standard model of fair allocation of resources to agents, every agent has some utility for every resource, and the goal is to assign resources to agents so that the agents' welfare is maximized. Motivated by job scheduling, interest…
This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group…
We study private-good allocation under general constraints. Several prominent examples are special cases, including house allocation, roommate matching, social choice, and multiple assignment. Every individually strategy-proof and Pareto…
In a strategy-proof mechanism, the influence of an agent may be measured as the set of outcomes an agent can bring about by varying her (reported) type. More specifically, we refer to an agent's influence on her own relevant outcomes as her…
We consider a social planner faced with a stream of myopic selfish agents. The goal of the social planner is to maximize the social welfare, however, it is limited to using only information asymmetry (regarding previous outcomes) and cannot…
We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [1] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders and for the public project problem, and in each case social welfare undominated mechanisms in the…
A set of $m$ indivisible goods is to be allocated to a set of $n$ agents. Each agent $i$ has an additive valuation function $v_i$ over goods. The value of a good $g$ for agent $i$ is either $1$ or $s$, where $s$ is a fixed rational number…
Selecting $k$ out of $m$ items based on the preferences of $n$ heterogeneous agents is a widely studied problem in algorithmic game theory. If agents have approval preferences over individual items and harmonic utility functions over…