Related papers: Simple Delegated Choice
In economic theory, an agent chooses from available alternatives -- modeled as a set. In decisions in the field or in the lab, however, agents do not have access to the set of alternatives at once. Instead, alternatives are represented by…
We introduce a novel model of contracts with combinatorial actions that accounts for sequential and adaptive agent behavior. As in the standard model, a principal delegates the execution of a costly project to an agent. There are $n$…
We are considering the problem of optimal portfolio delegation between an investor and a portfolio manager under a random default time. We focus on a novel variation of the Principal-Agent problem adapted to this framework. We address the…
Coordination of distributed agents is required for problems arising in many areas, including multi-robot systems, networking and e-commerce. As a formal framework for such problems, we use the decentralized partially observable Markov…
Sequential allocation is a simple and widely studied mechanism to allocate indivisible items in turns to agents according to a pre-specified picking sequence of agents. At each turn, the current agent in the picking sequence picks its most…
We study the problem of a principal who wants to influence an agent's observable action, subject to an ex-post budget. The agent has a private type determining their cost function. This paper endogenizes the value of the resource driving…
We consider a decision maker who must choose an action in order to maximize a reward function that depends also on an unknown parameter {\Theta}. The decision maker can delay taking the action in order to experiment and gather additional…
We consider a single-facility location problem, where agents are positioned on the real line and are partitioned into multiple disjoint districts. The goal is to choose a location (where a public facility is to be built) so as to minimize…
It is often argued that an agent making decisions on behalf of two or more principals who have different utility functions should adopt a {\em Pareto-optimal} policy, i.e., a policy that cannot be improved upon for one agent without making…
The Assignment problem is a fundamental and well-studied problem in the intersection of Social Choice, Computational Economics and Discrete Allocation. In the Assignment problem, a group of agents expresses preferences over a set of items,…
Distributed optimization finds applications in large-scale machine learning, data processing and classification over multi-agent networks. In real-world scenarios, the communication network of agents may encounter latency that may affect…
Decentralized resource allocation is a key problem for large-scale autonomic (or self-managing) computing systems. Motivated by a data center scenario, we explore efficient techniques for resolving resource conflicts via cooperative…
Liquid democracy is a mechanism for the division of labor in decision-making through the transitive delegation of influence. In essence, all individuals possess the autonomy to determine the issues with which they will engage directly,…
We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the…
Fraud can pose a challenge in many resource allocation domains, including social service delivery and credit provision. For example, agents may misreport private information in order to gain benefits or access to credit. To mitigate this, a…
In many multiagent domains a set of agents exert effort towards a joint outcome, yet the individual effort levels cannot be easily observed. A typical example for such a scenario is routing in communication networks, where the sender can…
We study the problem of delegated choice with inspection cost (DCIC), which is a variant of the delegated choice problem by Kleinberg and Kleinberg (EC'18) as well as an extension of the Pandora's box problem with nonobligatory inspection…
In this paper, we study axiomatic foundations of Bayesian persuasion, where a principal (i.e., sender) delegates the task of choice making after informing a biased agent (i.e., receiver) about the payoff relevant uncertain state (see, e.g.,…
Impartial selection problems are concerned with the selection of one or more agents from a set based on mutual nominations from within the set. To avoid strategic nominations of the agents, the axiom of impartiality requires that the…
This paper derives polynomial-time approximation schemes for several NP-hard stochastic optimization problems from the algorithmic mechanism design and operations research literatures. The problems we consider involve a principal or seller…