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There are only limited classes of multi-player stochastic games in which independent learning is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Markov potential games are a key example of such classes. Prior work has outlined sets of…
Designing fair compensation mechanisms for demand response (DR) is challenging. This paper models the problem in a game theoretic setting and designs a payment distribution mechanism based on the Shapley Value. As exact computation of the…
We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…
We introduce a method based on the Public Goods Game for solving optimization tasks. In particular, we focus on the Traveling Salesman Problem, i.e. a NP-hard problem whose search space exponentially grows increasing the number of cities.…
Motivated by the fact that the worth of a coalition may depend on the order in which agents arrive, Nowak and Radzik (1994) (NR) introduced cooperative games with generalized characteristic functions. We study such temporal cooperative…
Much work has been done on the computation of market equilibria. However due to strategic play by buyers, it is not clear whether these are actually observed in the market. Motivated by the observation that a buyer may derive a better…
Many applications of RCTs involve the presence of multiple treatment administrators -- from field experiments to online advertising -- that compete for the subjects' attention. In the face of competition, estimating a causal effect becomes…
We propose an algorithm for computing Nash equilibria (NE) in a class of conflicts with multiple battlefields with uniform battlefield values and a non-linear aggregation function. By expanding the symmetrization idea of Hart [9], proposed…
Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…
Cooperative games provide a framework to study cooperation among self-interested agents. They offer a number of solution concepts describing how the outcome of the cooperation should be shared among the players. Unfortunately, computational…
There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information…
The Colonel Blotto Problem proposed by Borel in 1921 has served as a widely applicable model of budget-constrained simultaneous winner-take-all competitions in the social sciences. Applications include elections, advertising, R&D and more.…
We study a decentralized matching market in which firms sequentially make offers to potential workers. For each offer, the worker can choose "accept" or "reject," but the decision is irrevocable. The acceptance of an offer guarantees her…
Markovian network equilibrium generalizes the classical Wardrop equilibrium in network games. At a Markovian network equilibrium, each player of the game solves a Markov decision process instead of a shortest path problem. We propose two…
A new class of multi-player competitive stochastic games in discrete-time with an affine specification of the redistribution of payoffs at exercise is proposed and examined. Our games cover as a very special case the classic two-person…
We study balanced solutions for network bargaining games with general capacities, where agents can participate in a fixed but arbitrary number of contracts. We provide the first polynomial time algorithm for computing balanced solutions for…
In this paper, we propose an online-matching-based model to study the assignment problems arising in a wide range of online-matching markets, including online recommendations, ride-hailing platforms, and crowdsourcing markets. It features…
Bipartite matching, where agents on one side of a market are matched to agents or items on the other, is a classical problem in computer science and economics, with widespread application in healthcare, education, advertising, and general…
While discounted payoff games and classic games that reduce to them, like parity and mean-payoff games, are symmetric, their solutions are not. We have taken a fresh view on the constraints that optimal solutions need to satisfy, and…
We develop a hierarchical Bayesian dynamic game for competitive inventory and pricing under incomplete information. Two firms repeatedly choose order quantities and prices while facing two layers of uncertainty: unknown market demand and…