Related papers: Toward Optimal LLM Alignments Using Two-Player Gam…

We study a game between liquidity provider and liquidity taker agents interacting in an over-the-counter market, for which the typical example is foreign exchange. We show how a suitable design of parameterized families of reward functions…

Mean field games (MFG) and mean field control problems (MFC) are frameworks to study Nash equilibria or social optima in games with a continuum of agents. These problems can be used to approximate competitive or cooperative games with a…

While reinforcement learning (RL) has achieved notable success in various domains, training effective policies for complex tasks remains challenging. Agents often converge to local optima and fail to maximize long-term rewards. Existing…

We introduce Stackelberg Learning from Human Feedback (SLHF), a new framework for preference optimization. SLHF frames the alignment problem as a sequential-move game between two policies: a Leader, which commits to an action, and a…

We propose a new framework for imitation learning -- treating imitation as a two-player ranking-based game between a policy and a reward. In this game, the reward agent learns to satisfy pairwise performance rankings between behaviors,…

Recent advances at the intersection of reinforcement learning (RL) and visual intelligence have enabled agents that not only perceive complex visual scenes but also reason, generate, and act within them. This survey offers a critical and…

Reinforcement Learning from human feedback (RLHF) has been shown a promising direction for aligning generative models with human intent and has also been explored in recent works for alignment of diffusion generative models. In this work,…

Reinforcement learning (RL) often struggles with reward misalignment, where agents optimize given rewards but fail to exhibit the desired behaviors. This arises when the reward function incentivizes proxy behaviors misaligned with the true…

Text-based games are a natural challenge domain for deep reinforcement learning algorithms. Their state and action spaces are combinatorially large, their reward function is sparse, and they are partially observable: the agent is informed…

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), the standard for aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with human values, is known to fail to satisfy properties that are intuitively desirable, such as respecting the preferences of the…

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has traditionally focused on training specialized agents to optimize predefined reward functions within narrowly defined environments. However, the advent of powerful Large Language Models (LLMs) and increasingly…

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have garnered wide attention and led to successful products such as ChatGPT and GPT-4. Their proficiency in adhering to instructions and delivering harmless, helpful, and honest (3H)…

While there has been progress towards aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with human values and ensuring safe behaviour at inference time, safety guards can easily be removed when fine tuned on unsafe and harmful datasets. While this…

We investigate Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) in the context of a general preference oracle. In particular, we do not assume the existence of a reward function and an oracle preference signal drawn from the Bradley-Terry…

Aligning large language models (LLMs) to serve users with heterogeneous and potentially conflicting preferences is a central challenge for personalized and trustworthy AI. We formalize an ideal notion of universal alignment through…

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a recent technique to improve the quality of the text generated by a language model, making it closer to what humans would generate. A core ingredient in RLHF's success in aligning and…

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) allows us to train models, such as language models (LMs), to follow complex human preferences. In RLHF for LMs, we first train an LM using supervised fine-tuning, sample pairs of responses,…

This paper considers the problem of designing optimal algorithms for reinforcement learning in two-player zero-sum games. We focus on self-play algorithms which learn the optimal policy by playing against itself without any direct…

As large language models grow increasingly capable, concerns about their safe deployment have intensified. While numerous alignment strategies aim to restrict harmful behavior, these defenses can still be circumvented through carefully…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…