Related papers: Finding pure Nash equilibria in large random games

This paper presents scalable algorithms for computing pure Nash equilibria (PNEs) in large-scale integer programming games (IPGs), where existing exact methods typically handle only small numbers of players. Motivated by a county-level…

In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…

We analyze the performance of the best-response dynamic across all normal-form games using a random games approach. The playing sequence -- the order in which players update their actions -- is essentially irrelevant in determining whether…

This paper examines the convergence behaviour of simultaneous best-response dynamics in random potential games. We provide a theoretical result showing that, for two-player games with sufficiently many actions, the dynamics converge quickly…

Best response (BR) dynamics is a natural method by which players proceed toward a pure Nash equilibrium via a local search method. The quality of the equilibrium reached may depend heavily on the order by which players are chosen to perform…

We study the convergence time of the best response dynamics in player-specific singleton congestion games. It is well known that this dynamics can cycle, although from every state a short sequence of best responses to a Nash equilibrium…

The dense deployment of small-cell base stations in HetSNets requires efficient resource allocation techniques. More precisely, the problem of associating users to SBSs must be revised and carefully studied. This problem is NP-hard and…

Robots navigating in crowded areas should negotiate free space with humans rather than fully controlling collision avoidance, as this can lead to freezing behavior. Game theory provides a framework for the robot to reason about potential…

We consider finite two-player normal form games with random payoffs. Player A's payoffs are i.i.d. from a uniform distribution. Given p in [0, 1], for any action profile, player B's payoff coincides with player A's payoff with probability p…

Inspired by the recent work by Shapiro et al. [45], we propose a Bayesian distributionally robust Nash equilibrium (BDRNE) model where each player lacks complete information on the true probability distribution of the underlying uncertainty…

In this paper we develop a novel approach to the convergence of Best-Response Dynamics for the family of interference games. Interference games represent the fundamental resource allocation conflict between users of the radio spectrum. In…

Best-response (BR) schemes represent an important avenue for learning equilibria in noncooperative games. However, extant rate guarantees for BR schemes generally necessitate stringent smoothness requirements on player objectives and the…

We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the…

Generating payoff matrices of normal-form games at random, we calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of $n$-player, $m$-strategy games. These are perfectly predictable as they must…

We study learnability of mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) in general finite games using higher-order replicator dynamics as well as classes of higher-order uncoupled heterogeneous dynamics. In higher-order uncoupled learning dynamics,…

This work proposes a policy learning algorithm for seeking generalised feedback Nash equilibria (GFNE) in $N_P$-player noncooperative dynamic games. We consider linear-quadratic games with stochastic dynamics and design a best-response…

We consider evolutionary games on a population whose underlying topology of interactions is determined by a binomial random graph $G(n,p)$. Our focus is on 2-player symmetric games with 2 strategies played between the incident members of…

Nash Equilibrium and its robust counterpart, Distributionally Robust Nash Equilibrium (DRNE), are fundamental problems in game theory with applications in economics, engineering, and machine learning. This paper addresses the problem of…

We study the robust Nash equilibrium (RNE) for a class of games in communications systems and networks where the impact of users on each other is an additive function of their strategies. Each user measures this impact, which may be…

We consider coalition formation among players in an n-player finite strategic game over infinite horizon. At each time a randomly formed coalition makes a joint deviation from a current action profile such that at new action profile all…