Related papers: Roping in Uncertainty: Robustness and Regularizati…

Zero-sum games are a fundamental setting for adversarial training and decision-making in multi-agent learning (MAL). Existing methods often ensure convergence to (approximate) Nash equilibria by introducing a form of regularization. Yet,…

We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…

In dynamic games with shared constraints, Generalized Nash Equilibria (GNE) are often computed using the normalized solution concept, which assumes identical Lagrange multipliers for shared constraints across all players. While widely used,…

This paper makes progress towards learning Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum Markov games from offline data. Specifically, consider a $\gamma$-discounted infinite-horizon Markov game with $S$ states, where the max-player has $A$…

We initiate the study of how to perturb the reward in a zero-sum Markov game with two players to induce a desirable Nash equilibrium, namely arbitrating. Such a problem admits a bi-level optimization formulation. The lower level requires…

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) holds great potential but faces robustness challenges due to environmental uncertainty. To address this, distributionally robust Markov games (RMGs) optimize worst-case performance when the…

While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash…

In this paper we investigate the tractability of robust Markov Decision Processes (RMDPs) under various structural assumptions on the uncertainty set. Surprisingly, we show that in all generality (i.e. without any assumption on the…

We present a computational formulation for the approximate version of several variational inequality problems, investigating their computational complexity and establishing PPAD-completeness. Examining applications in computational game…

Pseudo-games are a natural and well-known generalization of normal-form games, in which the actions taken by each player affect not only the other players' payoffs, as in games, but also the other players' strategy sets. The solution…

We present a simple primal-dual algorithm for computing approximate Nash-equilibria in two-person zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information and perfect recall (like Texas Hold'em Poker). Our algorithm is numerically stable,…

We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…

An ideal strategy in zero-sum games should not only grant the player an average reward no less than the value of Nash equilibrium, but also exploit the (adaptive) opponents when they are suboptimal. While most existing works in Markov games…

We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…

We study the complexity of computing a uniform Nash equilibrium on a non-win-lose bimatrix game. It is known that such a problem is NP-complete even if a bimatrix game is win-lose (Bonifaci et al., 2008). Fortunately, if a win-lose bimatrix…

The rank of a bimatrix game (A,B) is defined as rank(A+B). Computing a Nash equilibrium (NE) of a rank-$0$, i.e., zero-sum game is equivalent to linear programming (von Neumann'28, Dantzig'51). In 2005, Kannan and Theobald gave an FPTAS for…

We study Nash equilibrium learning in partially observable Markov games (POMGs), a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework in which agents cannot fully observe the underlying state. Prior work in this setting relies on centralization…

The multi-cluster games are addressed in this paper, where all players team up with the players in the cluster that they belong to, and compete against the players in other clusters to minimize the cost function of their own cluster. The…

We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…

We propose a new class of games, called Multi-Games (MG), in which a given number of players play a fixed number of basic games simultaneously. In each round of the MG, each player will have a specific set of weights, one for each basic…