Related papers: Matching With Pre-Existing Binding Agreements: The…
We study a practical centralized matching problem which assigns children to daycare centers. The collective preferences of siblings from the same family introduce complementarities, which can lead to the absence of stable matchings, as…
We consider a simple market where a vendor offers multiple variants of a certain product and preferences of both the vendor and potential buyers are heterogeneous and possibly even antagonistic. Optimization of the joint benefit of the…
We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…
This paper studies decentralized re-equilibration following population shocks, such as worker exits or firm entries, in many-to-many matching markets with contracts under substitutable preferences. We show that restricting any pre-shock…
Stable matching, a classical model for two-sided markets, has long been studied with little consideration for how each side's preferences are learned. With the advent of massive online markets powered by data-driven matching platforms, it…
We study the stable matching problem under the random matching model where the preferences of the doctors and hospitals are sampled uniformly and independently at random. In a balanced market with $n$ doctors and $n$ hospitals, the…
Matching platforms, from ridesharing to food delivery to competitive gaming, face a fundamental operational dilemma: match agents immediately to minimize waiting costs, or delay to exploit the efficiency gains of thicker markets. Yet…
We present a prototype hybrid prediction market and demonstrate the avenue it represents for meaningful human-AI collaboration. We build on prior work proposing artificial prediction markets as a novel machine-learning algorithm. In an…
We study dynamic matching in exchange markets with easy- and hard-to-match agents. A greedy policy, which attempts to match agents upon arrival, ignores the positive externality that waiting agents generate by facilitating future matchings.…
Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. Classical notions of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik,…
Algorithmic monoculture arises when many decision-makers rely on the same algorithm to evaluate applicants. An emerging body of work investigates possible harms of this kind of homogeneity, but has been limited by the challenge of…
Prediction markets elicit and aggregate beliefs by paying agents based on how close their predictions are to a verifiable future outcome. However, outcomes of many important questions are difficult to verify or unverifiable, in that the…
In a multiple partners matching problem the agents can have multiple partners up to their capacities. In this paper we consider both the two-sided many-to-many stable matching problem and the one-sided stable fixtures problem under…
Although the specific structures of electricity markets are diverse around the world, they were all conceived on the premise of predictable, controllable generation with nonnegligible marginal costs. Recent changes, specifically, the…
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will find a…
We develop inference for a two-sided matching model where the characteristics of agents on one side of the market are endogenous due to pre-matching investments. The model can be used to measure the impact of frictions in labour markets…
We study how information perturbations can destabilize two-sided matching markets. In our model, agents arrive on the market over two periods, while agents in the first period do not know the types of those arriving later. Agents already…
Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching…
Online graph problems are considered in models where the irrevocability requirement is relaxed. Motivated by practical examples where, for example, there is a cost associated with building a facility and no extra cost associated with doing…
In many two-sided labor markets, interviews are conducted before matches are formed. The growing number of interviews in medical residency markets has increased demand for signaling mechanisms, where applicants send a limited number of…