Related papers: Generalized Bayesian Nash Equilibrium with Continu…
We analyze a market impact game between $n$ risk averse agents who compete for liquidity in a market impact model with permanent price impact and additional slippage. Most market parameters, including volatility and drift, are allowed to…
Algorithm design and analysis is a cornerstone of computer science, but it confronts a major challenge. Proving an algorithm's performance guarantee across all inputs has traditionally required extensive and often error-prone human effort.…
In a society of completely selfish individuals where everybody is only interested in maximizing his own payoff, does any equilibrium exist for the society? John Nash proved more than 50 years ago that an equilibrium always exists such that…
Computing a Nash equilibrium (NE) is a central task in computer science. An NE is a particularly appropriate solution concept for two-agent settings because coalitional deviations are not an issue. However, even in this case, finding an NE…
This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…
This paper considers the problem of co-synthesis in $k$-player games over a finite graph where each player has an individual $\omega$-regular specification $\phi_i$. In this context, a secure equilibrium (SE) is a Nash equilibrium w.r.t.…
The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the…
In a society of multiple individuals, if everybody is only interested in maximizing his own payoff, will there exist any equilibrium for the society? John Nash proved more than 50 years ago that an equilibrium always exists such that nobody…
We provide a distributed algorithm to learn a Nash equilibrium in a class of non-cooperative games with strongly monotone mappings and unconstrained action sets. Each player has access to her own smooth local cost function and can…
We consider generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with non-convex strategy spaces and non-convex cost functions. This general class of games includes the important case of games with mixed-integer variables for which only a few…
We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike.…
When multiple influencers attempt to compete for a receiver's attention, their influencing strategies must account for the presence of one another. We introduce the Battling Influencers Game (BIG), a multi-player simultaneous-move…
Applications of combinatorial auctions (CA) as market mechanisms are prevalent in practice, yet their Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) remain poorly understood. Analytical solutions are known only for a few cases where the problem can be…
In single-agent Markov decision processes, an agent can optimize its policy based on the interaction with environment. In multi-player Markov games (MGs), however, the interaction is non-stationary due to the behaviors of other players, so…
We study competition between wireless devices with incomplete information about their opponents. We model such interactions as Bayesian interference games. Each wireless device selects a power profile over the entire available bandwidth to…
We consider distributed computation of generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) over networks, in games with shared coupling constraints. Existing methods require that each player has full access to opponents' decisions. In this paper, we assume…
We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time where players are characterized by time-evolving types. It is a natural assumption that the players' actions cannot anticipate future values of their types. Such games go under…
We consider the problem of finding stationary Nash equilibria (NE) in a finite discounted general-sum stochastic game. We first generalize a non-linear optimization problem from Filar and Vrieze [2004] to a $N$-player setting and break down…
This paper investigates Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problems for noncooperative games over multi-players networks with finite bandwidth communication. A distributed quantized algorithm is presented, which consists of local gradient play,…
We study a class of dynamic decision problems of mean field type with time inconsistent cost functionals, and derive a stochastic maximum principle to characterize subgame perfect Nash equilibrium points. Subsequently, this approach is…