Most General Winning Secure Equilibria Synthesis in Graph Games
Abstract
This paper considers the problem of co-synthesis in -player games over a finite graph where each player has an individual -regular specification . In this context, a secure equilibrium (SE) is a Nash equilibrium w.r.t. the lexicographically ordered objectives of each player to first satisfy their own specification, and second, to falsify other players' specifications. A winning secure equilibrium (WSE) is an SE strategy profile that ensures the specification if no player deviates from their strategy . Distributed implementations generated from a WSE make components act rationally by ensuring that a deviation from the WSE strategy profile is immediately punished by a retaliating strategy that makes the involved players lose. In this paper, we move from deviation punishment in WSE-based implementations to a distributed, assume-guarantee based realization of WSE. This shift is obtained by generalizing WSE from strategy profiles to specification profiles with , which we call most general winning secure equilibria (GWSE). Such GWSE have the property that each player can individually pick a strategy winning for (against all other players) and all resulting strategy profiles are guaranteed to be a WSE. The obtained flexibility in players' strategy choices can be utilized for robustness and adaptability of local implementations. Concretely, our contribution is three-fold: (1) we formalize GWSE for -player games over finite graphs, where each player has an -regular specification ; (2) we devise an iterative semi-algorithm for GWSE synthesis in such games, and (3) obtain an exponential-time algorithm for GWSE synthesis with parity specifications .
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2401.09957,
title = {Most General Winning Secure Equilibria Synthesis in Graph Games},
author = {Satya Prakash Nayak and Anne-Kathrin Schmuck},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.09957},
year = {2024}
}
Comments
TACAS 2024