Related papers: The Power of Two in Token Systems
Assignment markets involve matching with transfers, as in labor markets and housing markets. We consider a two-sided assignment market with agent types and stochastic structure similar to models used in empirical studies, and characterize…
We describe a two-stage mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in two-agent environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks one agent to set prices for each outcome, and the other agent to make a choice,…
This paper investigates the problem of coordinating several agents through their actions. Although the methodology applies to general scenarios, the present work focuses on a situation with an asymmetric observation structure that only…
The large-scale allocation of public resources (e.g., transportation, energy) is among the core challenges of future Cyber-Physical-Human Systems (CPHS). In order to guarantee that these systems are efficient and fair, recent works have…
Equitability is a well-studied fairness notion in fair division, where an allocation is equitable if all agents receive equal utility from their allocation. For indivisible items, an exactly equitable allocation may not exist, and a natural…
I study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous goods when monetary transfers are prohibited. Agents have private values, and the designer chooses a mechanism subject to incentive compatibility and aggregate supply constraints. I…
I study a repeated auction in which payments are made with a blockchain token created and initially owned by the auction designer. Unlike the ``virtual money'' previously examined in mechanism design, such tokens can be saved and traded…
We consider a control problem involving several agents coupled through multiple unit-demand resources. Such resources are indivisible, and each agent's consumption is modeled as a Bernoulli random variable. Controlling the number of such…
Two agents trade an item in a simultaneous offer setting, where the exchange takes place if and only if the buyer's bid price weakly exceeds the seller's ask price. Each agent is randomly assigned the buyer or seller role. Both agents are…
Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…
We explore stability and fairness considerations in decentralized networked markets with bilateral contracts, building on the trading networks framework [Hatfield et al., 2013]. In our trading network game, we show that a well-defined…
We examine an economy in which interactions are more productive if agents can trust others to refrain from cheating. Some agents are scoundrels, who cheat at every opportunity, while others cheat only if the cost of cheating, a decreasing…
We suggest the re-introduction of bartering to create a cryptocurrencyless, currencyless, and moneyless economy segment. We contend that a barter economy would benefit enterprises, individuals, governments and societies. For instance, the…
Most modern financial markets use a continuous double auction mechanism to store and match orders and facilitate trading. In this paper we develop a microscopic dynamical statistical model for the continuous double auction under the…
We study the design of optimal allocation mechanisms in an environment where agents and goods arrive stochastically. Agents have private types that determine the principal payoff. Either agents or goods can be held in a queue at a flow cost…
We construct a privacy-preserving, distributed and decentralized marketplace where parties can exchange data for tokens. In this market, buyers and sellers make transactions in a blockchain and interact with a third party, called notary,…
Agents buy and sell services. All services are of equal quality. Buyers choose sellers at random. Monetary and fiscal policies are imposed by a central bank and a central government. Credit is supplied by a commercial banking system.…
We show that a large effective number of commodities can be a source of equilibrium stability and uniqueness: expanding substitution opportunities strengthens aggregate substitution effects. We study finite dated-commodity exchange…
This paper proposes a model that enables permissionless and decentralized networks for complex computations. We explore the integration and optimize load balancing in an open, decentralized computational network. Our model leverages…
We consider the problem of load balancing in parallel queues by transferring customers between them at discrete points in time. Holding costs accrue as customers wait in the queue, while transfer decisions incur both fixed (setup) costs and…