Related papers: Completeness of two fragments of a logic for condi…
We consider systems of rational agents who act and interact in pursuit of their individual and collective objectives. We study and formalise the reasoning of an agent, or of an external observer, about the expected choices of action of the…
Coalition Logic is a central logic in logical research on strategic reasoning. In a recent paper, Li and Ju argued that generally, models of Coalition Logic, concurrent game models, have three too strong assumptions: seriality, independence…
Coalition Logic is an important logic in logical studies of strategic reasoning, whose models are concurrent game models. In this paper, first, we systematically discuss three assumptions of concurrent game models and argue that they are…
Strategy Logic (SL, for short) has been recently introduced by Mogavero, Murano, and Vardi as a useful formalism for reasoning explicitly about strategies, as first-order objects, in multi-agent concurrent games. This logic turns to be very…
The article introduces a notion of a stochastic game with failure states and proposes two logical systems with modality "coalition has a strategy to transition to a non-failure state with a given probability while achieving a given goal."…
Causal reasoning and logical reasoning are two important types of reasoning abilities for human intelligence. However, their relationship has not been extensively explored under machine intelligence context. In this paper, we explore how…
We introduce the logic LRC, designed to describe and reason about agents' abilities and capabilities in using resources. The proposed framework bridges two - up to now - mutually independent strands of literature: the one on logics of…
Strategy Logic (SL, for short) has been introduced by Mogavero, Murano, and Vardi as a useful formalism for reasoning explicitly about strategies, as first-order objects, in multi-agent concurrent games. This logic turns out to be very…
As a pivotal component to attaining generalizable solutions in human intelligence, reasoning provides great potential for reinforcement learning (RL) agents' generalization towards varied goals by summarizing part-to-whole arguments and…
We extend concurrent game structures (CGSs) with a simple notion of preference over computations and define a minimal notion of rationality for agents based on the concept of dominance. We use this notion to interpret a CL and an ATL…
We introduce a logic specifically designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We establish a correspondence between…
Large language models can produce correct answers while relying on flawed reasoning traces, partly because common training objectives reward final-answer correctness rather than faithful intermediate reasoning. This undermines…
Strategy Logic (SL) is a logical formalism for strategic reasoning in multi-agent systems. Its main feature is that it has variables for strategies that are associated to specific agents with a binding operator. We introduce Graded Strategy…
We propose an extension of Strategy Logic (SL), in which one can both reason about strategizing under imperfect information and about players' knowledge. One original aspect of our approach is that we do not force strategies to be uniform,…
Driven by recent successes in two-player, zero-sum game solving and playing, artificial intelligence work on games has increasingly focused on algorithms that produce equilibrium-based strategies. However, this approach has been less…
Concurrent stochastic games are an important formalism for the rational verification of probabilistic multi-agent systems, which involves verifying whether a temporal logic property is satisfied in some or all game-theoretic equilibria of…
Realizability asks whether there exists a program satisfying its specification. In this problem, we assume that each agent has her own objective and behaves rationally to satisfy her objective. Traditionally, the rationality of agents is…
Selective rationalization has become a common mechanism to ensure that predictive models reveal how they use any available features. The selection may be soft or hard, and identifies a subset of input features relevant for prediction. The…
In open systems verification, to formally check for reliability, one needs an appropriate formalism to model the interaction between agents and express the correctness of the system no matter how the environment behaves. An important…
We introduce a new decidable fragment of first-order logic with equality, which strictly generalizes two already well-known ones -- the Bernays-Sch\"onfinkel-Ramsey (BSR) Fragment and the Monadic Fragment. The defining principle is the…