Related papers: A Payoff-Based Policy Gradient Method in Stochasti…

There exist a number of reinforcement learning algorithms which learnby climbing the gradient of expected reward. Their long-runconvergence has been proved, even in partially observableenvironments with non-deterministic actions, and…

We examine the use of different randomisation policies for stochastic gradient algorithms used in sampling, based on first-order (or overdamped) Langevin dynamics, the most popular of which is known as Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics.…

We consider a general-sum N-player linear-quadratic game with stochastic dynamics over a finite horizon and prove the global convergence of the natural policy gradient method to the Nash equilibrium. In order to prove the convergence of the…

This paper proposes a payoff perturbation technique for the Mirror Descent (MD) algorithm in games where the gradient of the payoff functions is monotone in the strategy profile space, potentially containing additive noise. The optimistic…

We consider a distributed stochastic approximation (SA) scheme for computing an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash game. Standard SA schemes employ diminishing steplength sequences that are square summable but not summable. Such requirements…

In this paper, we propose a passivity-based methodology for analysis and design of reinforcement learning in multi-agent finite games. Starting from a known exponentially-discounted reinforcement learning scheme, we show that convergence to…

We propose a simple, general and effective technique, Reward Randomization for discovering diverse strategic policies in complex multi-agent games. Combining reward randomization and policy gradient, we derive a new algorithm,…

We study a setting in which two players play a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, while a learner observes only their actions and has no knowledge of the equilibrium or the underlying game. A natural question is…

Policy gradient methods, which have been extensively studied in the last decade, offer an effective and efficient framework for reinforcement learning problems. However, their performances can often be unsatisfactory, suffering from…

In this paper,we consider the restless bandit problem, which is one of the most well-studied generalizations of the celebrated stochastic multi-armed bandit problem in decision theory. However, it is known be PSPACE-Hard to approximate to…

Learning or estimating game models from data typically entails inducing separate models for each setting, even if the games are parametrically related. In empirical mechanism design, for example, this approach requires learning a new game…

Many high-stakes decision-making problems, such as those found within cybersecurity and economics, can be modeled as competitive resource allocation games. In these games, multiple players must allocate limited resources to overcome their…

We investigate the resolution of second-order, potential, and monotone mean field games with the generalized conditional gradient algorithm, an extension of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm. We show that the method is equivalent to the fictitious…

We introduce the Colonel Blotto game with favoritism, an extension of the famous Colonel Blotto game where the winner-determination rule is generalized to include pre-allocations and asymmetry of the players' resources effectiveness on each…

This paper studies the last-iterate convergence properties of the exponential weights algorithm with constant learning rates. We consider a repeated interaction in discrete time, where each player uses an exponential weights algorithm…

We study a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, namely, stochastic games with independent chains and unknown transition matrices. In this class of games, players control their own internal Markov chains whose transitions do not depend…

We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that…

Zero-sum stochastic games are easy to solve as they can be cast as simple Markov decision processes. This is however not the case with general-sum stochastic games. A fairly general optimization problem formulation is available for…

We consider the computation of an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash equilibrium problem, where the player objectives are assumed to be $L_0$-Lipschitz continuous and convex given rival decisions with convex and closed player-specific…

Real world applications such as economics and policy making often involve solving multi-agent games with two unique features: (1) The agents are inherently asymmetric and partitioned into leaders and followers; (2) The agents have different…