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We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…
We study turn-based stochastic zero-sum games with lexicographic preferences over reachability and safety objectives. Stochastic games are standard models in control, verification, and synthesis of stochastic reactive systems that exhibit…
We study best-response type learning dynamics for zero-sum polymatrix games under two information settings. The two settings are distinguished by the type of information that each player has about the game and their opponents' strategy. The…
Computational aspects of solution notions such as Nash equilibrium have been extensively studied, including settings where the ultimate goal is to find an equilibrium that possesses some additional properties. Furthermore, in order to…
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…
Consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic game where the transition function can be embedded in a given feature space. We propose a two-player Q-learning algorithm for approximating the Nash equilibrium strategy via sampling. The algorithm…
This paper deals with the complexity of the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium for discrete preference games and network coordination games beyond $O(\log n)$-treewidth and tree metric spaces. First, we estimate the number of…
Extensive-form games with imperfect recall are an important game-theoretic model that allows a compact representation of strategies in dynamic strategic interactions. Practical use of imperfect recall games is limited due to negative…
Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…
We study deterministic games of infinite duration played on graphs and focus on the strategy complexity of quantitative objectives. Such games are known to admit optimal memoryless strategies over finite graphs, but require infinite-memory…
We consider a general class of nonzero-sum $N$-player stochastic games with impulse controls, where players control the underlying dynamics with discrete interventions. We adopt a verification approach and provide sufficient conditions for…
In this article, we consider generalized Nash games where the associated constraint map is not necessarily self. The classical Nash equilibrium may not exist for such games and therefore we introduce the notion of best approximate solution…
Two-player, turn-based, stochastic games with reachability conditions are considered, where the maximizer has no information (he is blind) and is restricted to deterministic strategies whereas the minimizer is perfectly informed. We ask the…
Mean-payoff games are important quantitative models for open reactive systems. They have been widely studied as games of full observation. In this paper we investigate the algorithmic properties of several sub-classes of mean-payoff games…
An ideal strategy in zero-sum games should not only grant the player an average reward no less than the value of Nash equilibrium, but also exploit the (adaptive) opponents when they are suboptimal. While most existing works in Markov games…
Partially Observable Markov Games (POMGs) provide a general framework for modeling multi-agent sequential decision-making under asymmetric information. A common approach is to reformulate a POMG as a fully observable Markov game over belief…
Computing Nash equilibrium policies is a central problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning that has received extensive attention both in theory and in practice. However, provable guarantees have been thus far either limited to fully…
We study the problem of computing stationary Nash equilibria in discounted perfect information stochastic games from the viewpoint of computational complexity. For two-player games we prove the problem to be in PPAD, which together with a…
The beyond worst-case threshold problem (BWC), recently introduced by Bruy\`ere et al., asks given a quantitative game graph for the synthesis of a strategy that i) enforces some minimal level of performance against any adversary, and ii)…
In this paper, we study one-player and two-player energy mean-payoff games. Energy mean-payoff games are games of infinite duration played on a finite graph with edges labeled by 2-dimensional weight vectors. The objective of the first…