Related papers: Committee Elections with Candidate Attribute Const…
We study the knapsack problem with group fairness constraints. The input of the problem consists of a knapsack of bounded capacity and a set of items, each item belongs to a particular category and has and associated weight and value. The…
Suppose a committee consisting of three members has to match $n$ candidates to $n$ different positions. Each member of the committee proposes a matching, however the proposed matchings totally disagree, i.e., every candidate is matched to…
Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of ``yea''…
We study parameterized Constraint Satisfaction Problem for infinite constraint languages. The parameters that we study are weight of the satisfying assignment, number of constraints, maximum number of occurrences of a variable in the…
An election over a finite set of candidates is called single-crossing if, as we sweep through the list of voters from left to right, the relative order of every pair of candidates changes at most once. Such elections have many attractive…
Motivated by the dynamic assortment offerings and item pricings occurring in e-commerce, we study a general problem of allocating finite inventories to heterogeneous customers arriving sequentially. We analyze this problem under the…
We study the problem of selecting a representative committee of $k$ agents from a collection of $n$ agents in a common metric space. This problem is related to choosing $k$ facilities in facility location and $k$-median problems. However,…
The sequential allocation protocol is a simple and popular mechanism to allocate indivisible goods, in which the agents take turns to pick the items according to a predefined sequence. While this protocol is not strategy-proof, it has been…
When computing stable matchings, it is usually assumed that the preferences of the agents in the matching market are fixed. However, in many realistic scenarios, preferences change over time. Consequently, an initially stable matching may…
Impartial selection has recently received much attention within the multi-agent systems community. The task is, given a directed graph representing nominations to the members of a community by other members, to select the member with the…
The ridesharing problem is that given a set of trips, each trip consists of an individual, a vehicle of the individual and some requirements, select a subset of trips and use the vehicles of selected trips to deliver all individuals to…
Justified Representation (JR)/Extended Justified Representation (EJR) is a desirable axiom in multiwinner approval voting. In contrast to that (E)JR only requires at least \emph{one} voter to be represented in every cohesive group, we study…
In the Secretary Problem, one has to hire the best among n candidates. The candidates are interviewed, one at a time, at a random order, and one has to decide on the spot, whether to hire a candidate or continue interviewing. It is well…
A population of voters must elect representatives among themselves to decide on a sequence of possibly unforeseen binary issues. Voters care only about the final decision, not the elected representatives. The disutility of a voter is…
Coalition formation is a key topic in multi-agent systems. Coalitions enable agents to achieve goals that they may not have been able to achieve on their own. Previous work has shown problems in coalitional games to be computationally hard.…
We consider a stochastic online problem where $n$ applicants arrive over time, one per time step. Upon arrival of each applicant their cost per time step is revealed, and we have to fix the duration of employment, starting immediately. This…
We study the election control problem with multi-votes, where each voter can present a single vote according different views (or layers, we use "layer" to represent "view"). For example, according to the attributes of candidates, such as:…
We study a constrained version of the knapsack problem in which dependencies between items are given by the adjacencies of a graph. In the 1-neighbour knapsack problem, an item can be selected only if at least one of its neighbours is also…
The Condorcet criterion (CC) is a classical and well-accepted criterion for voting. Unfortunately, it is incompatible with many other desiderata including participation (Par), half-way monotonicity (HM), Maskin monotonicity (MM), and…
Judgment aggregation is a framework to aggregate individual opinions on multiple, logically connected issues into a collective outcome. These opinions are cast by judges, which can be for example referees, experts, advisors or jurors,…